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3Summary
In the mid-1980s, the temporary framework surrounding the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade had, to a large extent, out-lived itself. There
was a need to regulate new areas of trade and to create a new dispute
settlement procedure. From these trade negotiations, the World Trade
Organization was created, although there was no mandate to negotiate a new
institution. The WTO is a permanent international organization with an inter-
governmental character wherein the Ministerial Conference is the highest
decision-making body. Every-day-work is conducted by the General Council,
which also convenes as the Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism.
The key elements of the new dispute settlement procedure include
legalization, predictability, shorter time constraints, confidentiality, and the
possibility to appeal. WTO members must first resort to consultation before
requesting the formation of a panel. Panels consist of 3 to 5 panelists and are
chosen from a list of suitable candidates. The ad hoc character of the panels is
a weakness in the system that could be improved with a more permanent
structure. The General Council, meeting as the Dispute Settlement Body,
adopts panel reports unless there is a consensus not to adopt them. The
Standing Appellate Body consists of 7 permanent members and each appeal
is heard by a division consisting of 3 members. One of the major weaknesses
in the appellate review is the fact that there is no remand power. A plaintiff
thus loses the opportunity for a true appeal of a dispute that ought to be
remanded.
The different problem areas of the dispute settlement system include the total
confidentiality of the proceedings, and above all, the lack of transparency
regarding the behavior of panelists and Appellate Body members. In addition,
the WTO lacks enforcement powers and therefore has to rely on the good
faith of members to comply. Another problem is the notion of non-violation
complaints and situation complaints. In these types of complaints no explicit
provision of a covered agreement has been violated yet a WTO member feels
that benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the GATT 1947 has
been nullified or impaired, or, that the attainment of any objective of the
GATT has been impeded. This is in conflict with the obligations included in
Articles 3:2 and 3:5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes. These provisions state that a ruling or
recommendation of the Dispute Settlement Body cannot add to or diminish
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements nor can they
nullify or impair benefits accruing to members under these agreements or
impede the attainment of any objective of them. Rulings and
recommendations based on non-violation or situation complaints are not
binding.
4There is no stare decisis in international public law and decisions by WTO
dispute settlement bodies are therefore only binding to the dispute in
question. These decisions cannot expand the scope of the covered agreements
according to Articles 3:2 and 3:5 DSU. Other decisions by WTO organs, e.g.
the Ministerial meeting, do not seem to impose more obligations on the WTO
members than they themselves have already agreed upon. This is a result of
the inter-governmental character, and the lack of enforcement power of the
WTO.
Transparency forms an important part of the multilateral trade regime.
Although requirements of publicity are included in many of the covered
agreements, there is a predominance of confidentiality and secrecy within the
dispute settlement system. This confidentiality is necessary to some extent,
but also hurts the confidence in the system, especially concerning the
impartiality of panelists and Appellate Body members. A way to increase
transparency would be to create a monitoring body or an ombudsman to hear
complaints about alleged abuse of power or impropriety in dispute settlement
proceedings.
After the creation of the WTO dispute settlement system, an increasing
amount of initiated disputes has been seen as a sign of greater confidence in
the new system. In opposition, Eric Reinhardt presented a quantified analysis
of dispute initiation under both the GATT and the WTO claiming that the
increasing number of initiated disputes instead represents a challenge to the
system. He based his claim on different aspects of the increased number of
initiated disputes. Although many of his conclusions are valid, there are also
other explanations for these aspects that might cast doubt over his thesis.
First, increasing dispute initiation may be used as a “threat” for promoting
settling “out of court” thus being more cost-efficient. Second, transaction
costs in the new system are de jure lower although they might not be de facto
lower. Third, and finally, due to the fact that the new procedure is more
foreseeable this should mean that there would be less disputes initiated since
WTO members would be able to estimate the cost and benefits of initiating a
dispute more accurately. The increasing number of initiated disputes indicates
that the cost of a dispute is lower than the benefit, thus promoting confidence
in the system.
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61 Introduction
With the protectionism of the 1930s in fresh memory, a new global economic
regime was created after World War II in the shape of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The main purpose was to lower barriers to
trade among the contracting parties, mainly in the form of tariffs, and to
create a forum for further trade liberalization and trade dispute settlement.
This dispute settlement procedure evolved through practice over the years.
With a growing number of contracting parties to GATT 1947, an increase in
global trade, and the problems inherent in the existing dispute settlement
procedure, voices were raised to launch negotiations in not yet covered trade
areas and to replace the dispute settlement procedure with a more workable
procedure. The negotiations of the Uruguay Round were completed in April
1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco. Important institutional agreements and
agreements regarding services and intellectual property rights were reached.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced GATT as the central
institution for international trade cooperation in the world. Today the
organization has 135 members1. A more important result of the Uruguay
Round, for the sake of this paper, was the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). With the
implementation of this new procedure trade analysts predicted an increasing
reliance on the WTO system as a tool (threat) in bilateral and multilateral
trade negotiation. Since 1995, a growing number of cases have been filed
indicating to some scholars a greater confidence in the new system. A recent
statistical analysis of dispute initiation under the WTO by Eric Reinhardt
reached the opposite conclusion claiming that the increase in dispute
initiation was not due to confidence in the system, but rather represented a
challenge to the system.
1.1 Introduction of the Paper, Thesis and
Structure
With the growing globalization of the world economy, countries today
experience a loss of sovereignty in favor of international organizations.
Decisions made by policy-makers in these organizations will in some cases
have a large impact on domestic policy among the member countries. This is
very clear within the European Union (EU), but also within the framework of
the WTO. Despite this, most people lack a working knowledge of the WTO
beyond the fact that it is related to trade. Therefore, this paper purports to
present the WTO and part of its policy-making from a dispute settlement
perspective in order to promote further research about the legal framework of
the organization. This presentation is concentrated on conditions applying to
the United States of America (US) and the EU.
                                                
1 Jackson, John, “Designing and implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures”,
pp.161-162 from Krueger, Anne O. (ed.), “The WTO as an International Organization”,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
7The first part of this paper presents the development of the WTO through the
International Trade Organization (ITO) and GATT. This presentation is made
primarily from a political science perspective putting the development into a
historical-political light. I feel that this is necessary in order to have an
understanding for the direction that the development of the organization has
taken and for the conflicts arising today within the organization, inter alia,
the debate over linking social policy, environmental and labor issues with
trade. It also includes an overview of the institutional legal framework and
the legal principles guiding the different trade agreements. This is also
important in order to realize how certain principles affect the entire system.
The second, and major, part of this paper describes the procedural rules
surrounding dispute settlement. This is intended as a handbook for identifying
rules governing the procedure, and also to point out problem areas. The final
part argues that the higher number of disputes initiated under the WTO, as
compared to the GATT, stems from a greater confidence in the new system.
This part evaluates Eric Reinhardt's claim that the greater number of initiated
disputes is, in fact, a challenge to the system.
1.2 Means, Method and Sources
In the first part of this paper, articles, books and documents published by the
Swedish government, research institutions, different academic scholars and
the WTO were used. The vast majority of these sources were written from a
political science or economic perspective and they were available in
considerable numbers. At best, they can be considered to be secondary
sources. It turned out to be harder to find literature discussing the material
rules governing the WTO dispute settlement procedure. The main reason for
this is probably the fact that it has only been working since the beginning of
1995. Instead, the presentation and analysis are based almost entirely on
primary legal documents. I have also discussed aspects of this paper with
assistant professor Michael J. Hiscox at the University of California, San
Diego Department of Political Science, US, and Jean Monnet professor Carl
Michael Quitzow at the University of Lund Faculty of Law, Sweden.
My comments are indicated by the fact that no reference exists to literature or
other sources. The paper’s format follows the template provided by the
University of Lund Faculty of Law. Abbreviations and references to legal
documents are made in accordance with standards applicable to the issue in
question.
1.3 Limitation
The material presented and the interpretations made in this paper are entirely
my own views and does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Faculty
of Law at the University of Lund, Sweden, or the opinion of the sources
quoted or cited. I wish to apologize for any accidental misinterpretation or
misrepresentation of sources.
8Areas of interest that fall outside the scope of this paper are only discussed
briefly in order to bring the problem to the attention of the reader or to
indicated that they represent an interesting area for further research. In most
cases, a reference for a more elaborate discussion of the issue is provided.
These areas include, inter alia, the material rules in WTO trade agreements,
the future development of the WTO, the domestic aspect of decisions made
by the WTO, the WTO’s position in public international law, the treaty-
making power of the US and the EU, and economic aspects of the dispute
settlement procedure.
92 The Development of the ITO,
GATT and the WTO
2.1 The Agenda for the ITO
The US and Great Britain both played leading roles in building an
international trading system suitable for the post-World War II world.2
During the 1920s and the 1930s, protectionist policies made the economic
depression worse and also led to conflicts between countries. It was urgent to
create rules for international economic cooperation, and to have powerful
organizations for enforcement and surveillance.3 Separate trade negotiations
between the two countries began in 1943 but an agreement was never reached
due to disagreement over vital issues.4 Instead, in July 1944, representatives
from the US, Great Britain and 42 other countries met in Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire, US, to plan for the postwar economy. A consensus was
reached to promote free trade, nondiscrimination and stable exchange rates.5
The Bretton Woods system was based on the intention to set up three separate
organizations. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) was supposed to finance reconstruction after World War II while the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was in charge of an improved global
currency cooperation. The ITO was going to be a special agency of the United
Nations (UN) at the center of the new liberalized post-war trading system.6 In
the end of 1945, well after the completion of the Bretton Woods Agreement,
a document was released in Washington D.C. including a draft Charter for the
ITO and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947).7
The draft Charter for the ITO was finally presented and agreed upon at a UN
Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana in March 1948 but
ratification on the domestic level proved hard.8 The Charter compromises had
already been negotiated during the preparatory process and the Charter
provided rules relating to employment, development, antitrust, agriculture,
commodity agreements, restrictive business practices, international
investment and services, but above all world trade disciplines.9 No country
                                                
2 Ostry, Sylvia, “Reinforcing the WTO”, (Group of Thirty, Occasional Paper 56, 1998), p.3.
3 Sjöstedt, Gunnar, “IMF, WTO, Världsbanken”, (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet,
Organisationer i fickformat, 1995), p.3 (Sjöstedt I). Alvin, Lennart, “GATT inför Uruguay-
rundans slutförhandlingar, (Utrikesdepartementet informerar 1992:4), p.7.
4 Ostry, pp. 4-5.
5 McCormick, John, ”The European Union – Politics and Policies”, (Westview Press, 1996),
p.33.
6 Sjöstedt, Gunnar, “GATT i omvandling: mot förstärkning eller sammanbrott?”,
(Utrikespolitiska Institutet, Världspolitikens dagsfrågor, 1993:6), pp.6-7 (Sjöstedt II).
7 Ostry, p.5.
8 Trading into the future: WTO, p.8, (WTO Information and Media Relations Division,
1995).
9 Sjöstedt I, p.7. Ostry, p.5.
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took action to ratify the ITO charter after the Havana meeting. Instead, they
waited for the US to ratify it first. In 1949, President Truman would need an
extension of his negotiation authority and therefore decided not to send the
ITO to the Congress in 1948 due to lack of support and strong opposition.10
The ITO represented too much government intervention for free traders and
too much free trade for protectionists. With the start of the Korean War, US
interest in global cooperation waned and the government announced in 1950
that it would not seek congressional ratification of the Havana Charter.11 The
ITO was therefore dead.
2.2 GATT
2.2.1 Development
Tariff negotiations were opened among the 23 founding GATT12 contracting
parties in 1946. These concessions were protected by an early and provisional
acceptance of some of the trade rules in the ITO Charter.13 The provisional
agreement included parts of the ITO Charter acceptable to the US and was
never even put through the US Congress for approval.14 The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) was signed in Geneva October
30th 1947 by 23 states, but formation of the ITO failed, leaving the GATT
without an institutional frame. Over time though, the GATT was given an
institutional structure through practice. Starting in January 1948, GATT
members negotiated terms of trade in different so-called rounds, removing
barriers to trade through reciprocal concessions.15
GATT was an expanding “organization” and the de-colonization process
added more members. For the most part this was accomplished without
problems.16 Even outside the GATT system, GATT rules still spread due to
the fact that countries by and large followed the GATT practice.17 During the
1960s and 1970s, the development of international trade liberalization was
plagued by the Cold War conflict. In addition, GATT was perceived as an
organ for industrialized countries. As a result, cooperation between the
eastern bloc and certain Southern countries led to the creation of the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. That same year,
during the Kennedy Round negotiations, Part IV of the GATT 1947 was
introduced containing the alleviation of trade policy obligations for
                                                
10 The US Congress has the exclusive power to regulate commerce with foreign nations
according to Article 1 Section 8:3 of the US Constitution. Part of this power can be delegated
to the executive branch (the president).
11 Ostry, p.6.
12 GATT refers to the institutional structure while GATT 1947 and GATT 1994 refer to the
trade agreements concluded the same years.
13 Trading into the future: WTO, p.8.
14 Ostry, p.7.
15 McCormick, pp.33-34.
16 In 1956 during the Geneva Round negotiations, however, the adoption of Japan into the
GATT system proved to be a matter for dispute.
17 Sjöstedt II, pp.9-10.
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developing countries and the creation of the Committee on Trade and
Development to deal with trade issues related to developing countries.18 The
oil-crisis in the beginning of the 1970s saw growing protectionism and trade
policy moving inside domestic borders again. The 1973-1979 Tokyo Round
negotiations therefore included trade impeding barriers arising from domestic
policies such as subsidies, government procurement and regulation,
regulation of product standards, and strengthening of anti-dumping rules. A
more fundamental change triggered by the Tokyo Round was the legalization
of the trading system.19 Once again in the 1980s, world trade policy saw a
movement away from political issues towards de-regulation and a belief in
market economy. The Uruguay Round negotiations were launched in 1986.20
2.2.2 Organization, Structure and Tasks
The institutional framework surrounding GATT was never formalized. By
comparison, the other Bretton Woods institutions had financial and staff
resources with a clear mission and the capacity to carry it out.21 In GATT, a
standing administrative body dealt with the management of the agreement,
dispute settlement and the development of an international trading system.
There was also a non-permanent, but re-occurring body used for multilateral
trade negotiations in order to develop and change GATT 1947 in accordance
with the agreement.22
GATT was not a real multilateral organization and could therefore not have
members. Instead, members were referred to as the contracting parties.23 In
order to become a member, a country had to be able to provide extensive and
accurate information on domestic economic development and maintain a
convertible currency or otherwise maintain a reasonable balance between
exports and imports.24
The highest decision-making body consisted of the Contracting Parties’
Conference. The contracting parties met once a year for a session in
November or December, represented by a high ranking civil servant or the
head of their permanent delegation to GATT in Geneva, the “ambassador”.25
In between sessions, the Council of Representatives normally met once every
month making necessary every-day decisions. Members were generally
represented by their respective ambassadors. Subordinate to the Council, a
number of committees each dealt with a special problem or policy area. There
were also a number of special committees dealing with the internal GATT
finances and administration. The decision-making committees and
                                                
18 Sjöstedt II, pp.11-12.
19 Ostry, p.8.
20 Sjöstedt I, p.11.
21 Ostry, p.1.
22 Sjöstedt II, p.15.
23 For the sake of this paper the contracting parties will be referred to as members. Sjöstedt II,
p.8.
24 Sjöstedt II, p.9.
25 Sjöstedt II, p.15.
12
institutions were supported by a Secretariat.26 The Secretariat did not have the
same amount of power as the UN Secretariat and was subordinate to the
Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization (ICITO),
although it was also subordinate to the contraction parties. A Director-
General appointed by the contracting parties led the GATT Secretariat
supported by some minor administrative bodies. The Secretariat was divided
into two Departments each lead by a Deputy Director-General. Each
department, in turn consisted of six divisions.27
2.2.3 Multilateral Trade Negotiations28
Some changes in the GATT system could take place in the every day
administration of the system by the permanent bodies.29 More widespread
changes had to be discussed in multilateral trade negotiation rounds. The
negotiation rounds were not administered by a permanent body. Instead, a
special institution was created for each separate round. The highest decision-
making body was the Ministerial Meeting, normally consisting of the
members’ trade or financial ministers. Each round generally started and
ended with a Ministerial Meeting. During the negotiation work, the Trade
Negotiations Committee was the highest decision-making body where
members were normally represented by the head of each respective
delegation. Their task was to have overall control and an overview of the
negotiations. The Trade Negotiations Committee had few meetings and the
main work with the negotiations took place in different Negotiation Groups.
Each Negotiation Group was responsible for a certain interest area and the
number of groups depended on the agenda. Sub-groups could be set up on
demand. The corresponding unit in the GATT Secretariat supported the
Negotiation Groups. The Secretariat’s involvement in the negotiations was
separated from the every day administration of the GATT. Negotiations were
conducted according to certain principles. The rule of principal supplier
meant that negotiations were concentrated on large countries. An agreement
would then incorporate other countries through the “most-favored-nation”
rule (MFN). The disadvantage with this procedure was the fact that the larger
members represented a small part of the total members.30 Another principle
was that bargaining with bids and demands would be limited to the
Negotiation Group in question. Package deals were normally negotiated in
the end phase of a round or as bilateral agreements between two key
members.31
                                                
26 The Secretariat was a relatively small administrative body. Late 1991 and early 1992, the
Secretariat had a staff of 440 people out of which 195 were in management positions. The
GATT budget at the same time was US $107 million. Sjöstedt II, p.17.
27 Sjöstedt II, pp.8, 16-17.
28 So far, there has been no negotiation rounds under the WTO but it is reasonable to assume
that the GATT negotiation system will persist.
29 The Contracting Parties’ Conference could e.g. elect new members.
30 Compare this to the group system used in UNCTAD where developing countries can
participate actively.
31 Sjöstedt II, pp.18-20, 21-22.
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The first negotiation rounds in Annecy, France 1949, Torquay, Great Britain
1951, and Geneva, Switzerland 1956, mainly dealt with tariffs and the
practical side of GATT, e.g. membership issues and the provisional status of
the agreement. The Dillon Round 1960-1961 in Geneva, Switzerland, did not
lead to any major results despite an ambitious plan.32 It was not until the
Kennedy Round of 1964-1967 that any new ground was broken, in this case
regarding a new Anti-Dumping Agreement. Later on, during the Tokyo
Round negotiations in 1973-1979, the GATT system was improved and
extended through, inter alia, tariff reductions, an extensive legalization and
an improved dispute settlement mechanism.33 Although no agreements were
reached regarding farm trade and “safeguards”, a number of codes of
conduct34 dealing with non-tariff barriers emerged.35
2.3 WTO
2.3.1 Development
With the changing world trade environment and a growing globalization, the
GATT 1947 no longer was sufficient to regulate world trade. New areas of
business were exploding such as international investment and trade in
services. In addition, the institutional structure of GATT and its dispute
settlement system called for reform.36 Since the early 1980s, the US had tried
to launch a new negotiation round due to growing dissatisfaction with the
Tokyo Round’s results in conjunction with rising protectionism in the
American Congress and an overvalued dollar. The Uruguay Round was
finally launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay September 1986, but the
agreement to negotiate did not contain any authorization for the establishment
of a new trade organization.37
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, no new barriers to trade could be
erected (standstill) and measures in conflict with GATT 1947 had to be
removed (rollback).38 At the time of the “Mid-term Review” taking place in
Montreal, Canada in 1989, the Ministerial Meeting agreed on the mandate for
the second stage of the round and also some early results from the
negotiations. These agreements included concessions on market access for
tropical products, an improved dispute settlement procedure, agricultural aid,
and the establishment of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). A
proposal by Canada for the establishment of a new multilateral organization
                                                
32 Sjöstedt II, p.19.
33 Trading into the future: WTO, p.9.
34 These codes included Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Technical Barriers to Trade,
Import Licensing Procedures, Government Procurement, Customs Valuation, Anti-dumping,
Bovine Meat Arrangement, International Dairy Arrangement, and Trade in Civil Aircraft.
35 Alvin, p.13. Trading into the future: WTO, p.9.
36 Trading into the future: WTO, p.10.
37 Ostry, p.11. Utrikesdepartementet, “Uruguayrundan – från GATT till WTO”, p.9,
(Utrikesdepartementet informerar 1994:2).
38 Utrikesdepartementet, p.14.
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was put forward in April 1990. This proposal was supported by the European
Economic Communities (EEC). The preliminary name was the Multilateral
Trade Organization (MTO), which was changed in the end by a proposal
from the US.39 Negotiations were to be concluded in Brussels in December
1990 but failed due to problems reaching an agreement on the nature of
commitments to future agricultural trade reform.40 In December 1991 a Draft
Final Act (DFA) was presented and members purported to finish the Round
by Easter the following year.41 But, differences between the US and the EEC
made the negotiations last until December 15th 1993. On April 15th 1994, the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)
was signed in Marrakesh, Morocco by 123 participating governments.42 The
WTO Agreement also contained the establishment of an interim committee
responsible for the management of the organization until the WTO formally
existed.43 Observers saw the WTO as something close to the initial idea of a
sister organization to the Bretton-Woods institutions.44 The WTO functioned
parallel to the GATT from January 1st 1995 until the WTO superseded GATT
in January 1996.45
The biggest problems in the Uruguay Round primarily concerned the
previously unfinished business of reaching an agreement on agriculture and
trade in services between the US and the EEC.46 Another important aspect
was the US demand to include new agenda items into the GATT structure
such as trade in services, intellectual property rights and international
investments.47 This demand was also one of the catalysts in starting the
negotiations in the first place. But some members of GATT were unwilling to
incorporate new agreements such as the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) in GATT 1947. Instead, a new umbrella organization was
created in order to maintain uniformity.48 At the end of the negotiations,
certain issues remained unsettled. These areas included telecommunications,
movement of people performing services, maritime transports and financial
services. In order to finish these negotiations, four negotiation groups were
created and incorporated under the WTO.49
Today the WTO is preparing to launch a new negotiation round. On the
forefront of the agenda are environmental and social policy issues.
Industrialized countries, led by the US, want to use the WTO structure in
                                                
39 Ostry, p.19. Utrikesdepartementet, p.9.
40 Alvin, p.14. Trading into the future: WTO, p.11.
41 Alvin, p.14.
42 McCormick, pp.33-34.
43 Utrikesdepartementet, p.9.
44 Utrikesdepartementet, p.8.
45 McCormick, pp.33-34
46 Sjöstedt II, p.4, Ostry, p.11, Utrikesdepartementet, p.8.
47 Trade in services had grown since GATT 1947 and the US was the leading exporter in
services, investments and technology at the time. Intellectual property is also covered by the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Ostry, p.12.
48 Sjöstedt II, p.30.
49 Sjöstedt I, p.33.
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order to link trade negotiations with labor policy or environmental issues.50
Other issues include the lack of transparency in the organization and whether
or not China is to become a member. 51 52 Trade policy officials hoped to
settle some of these issues in the first negotiation round of the new millenium
starting with the 3rd Ministerial Conference in December 1999 in Seattle,
US.53 In Seattle, negotiations came under a Committee of the Whole with
specific subjects handled by Working Groups on: agriculture; implementation
and rule; market access; Singapore agenda and other issues; and systemic
issues.54 For the first time, a new Working Group on Trade and Labor
Standards also met in order to discuss a proposal for creating either such a
Working Group within the WTO or a body operated jointly by a number of
international organizations. A number of developing countries opposed the
creation of such a body.55 Another novelty was the first assembly of
legislators and parliamentaries held in parallel with the Ministerial
Conference.56 Unfortunately, the Seattle conference was not the success
hoped for in terms of results achieved. Agreements proved hard to reach and
left behind an indication of a split between developing and developed WTO
members as to what direction the WTO is to take in the future. The General
Council met in mid-December to discuss how to proceed with issues
outstanding from Seattle but decided to postpone such a decision until early
2000.57
2.3.2 Organization, Structure and Tasks
Unlike GATT, the WTO is a true international organization with a structure
and legal framework agreed upon in a multilateral document.58 The WTO is
                                                
50 Such a linkage might deprive developing countries of their comparative advantage and
could be seen as a sign of growing protectionism rather than a concern for workers or the
environment. For a discussion on comparative advantage, see Krugman, Paul R. & Obstfeld,
Maurice, “International Economics Theory and Policy”, 4th ed., (Addison-Wesley, 1997),
pp.13-37, Cohen, Stephen et. al., “Economic Theories of international Trade”, in
Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996) pp.55-82. For a
discussion on linkage, see Goldstein, Judith, pp. 133-52 and Anderson, Kym, pp. 231-55 in
Krueger.
51 This is similar to the debate about the democratic deficit within the European Union. See
Steiner, Josephine & Woods, Lorna, “Textbook on EC Law”, 5th ed., (Blackstone Press
Limited, 1997), pp. 20, 31, and Pålsson, Sten & Quitzow, Carl Michael, “EG-rätten – ny
rättskälla i Sverige”, (Stockholm: Publica, 1993), p.83.
52 China applied for ”membership” in GATT in 1986 but so far has not been considered as
having fulfilled the requirements for becoming a member. One of the major problems has
been Chinas political relations with the world, and in particular the most powerful WTO
members, e.g. the US and the EU. On November 15th 1999, an agreement on tariff alleviation
for American products on the Chinese market was reached between the US and China. If
similar agreements can be reached between China and key members of the WTO, China is
likely to be able to become a member. Ystads Allehanda, 11/16/99, p.28.
53 The conference took place November 30th to December 3rd 1999. The official homepage
can be found at http://www.wto.org/wto/seattle/mindex_e.htm accessed 01/03/00.
54 http://www.wto.org/wto/seattle/english/press_e/press160.htm accessed 01/03/00.
55 http://www.wto.org/wto/seattle/english/about_e/summary_02.htm accessed 01/03/00.
56 http://www.wto.org/wto/seattle/english/press_e/press160.htm accessed 01/03/00.
57 http://www.wto.org accessed 01/03/00.
58 For an overview of the WTO structure, see Appendix 1.
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lead by a Ministerial Conference required to meet at least every two years.
The Ministerial Conference can decide on all matters under any of the
covered multilateral agreements, Article IV (1) WTO Agreement.59 In
comparison, the highest decision-making body of GATT normally consisted
of civil servants while ministers only met during negotiation rounds.60 This
increased use of representatives from the members’ governments may be seen
as an indication of the importance of global trade issues in domestic policy.61
The General Council, consisting of all the WTO members manages day-to-
day business. In general, members are represented by staff from their
diplomatic mission to the WTO in Geneva, sometimes headed by a special
Ambassador. The General Council also convenes as the Dispute Settlement
Body and the Trade Policy Review Body, Article IV (2-4). Subordinate to the
General Council are three other councils: the Council for Trade in Goods, the
Council for Trade in Services and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Article IV (5). GATT had only one council in
total and the four council organization of the WTO is the result of a
compromise between members due to the introduction of new areas of trade
into the multilateral system. Several members opposed introducing these new
areas under the authority of the General Council. Similar to GATT, there is a
system of permanent committees under each council dealing with
surveillance of the covered agreements. Special work groups can also be
organized when needed.62
Three other bodies report directly to the General Council. First, the
Committee on Trade and Development deals with issues relating to
developing countries. Second, the Committee on Balance of Payments is
responsible for consultation between members and countries that undertake
trade-restrictive measures under Articles XII and XVIII GATT 1994. Finally,
the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration deals with WTO’s
financing and budget63, Article IV (7). In addition, each of the four
plurilateral agreements of the WTO have their own management bodies
reporting directly to the General Council, Article IV (8).
The WTO Secretariat has around 450 staff members and is based in Geneva,
Switzerland. It is led by a Director-General and four Deputy Directors-
General. The Secretariat’s main task is to service WTO delegate bodies with
respect to negotiations and the implementation of agreements. Other tasks
include technical support to developing countries and questions relating to the
accession of new members.64
                                                
59 All Articles in this section refer to the WTO Agreement if nothing else is noted.
60 Sjöstedt I, p.18.
61 Utrikesdepartementet, pp.10-11.
62 Sjöstedt I, p.19.
63 Mandatory fees from the members finance the WTO budget. Each country contribution is
determined by an index in proportion to the country’s part of world trade. 1995, the budget
was around US $83 million. Sjöstedt I, p.23, Trading into the future: WTO, p.14, and Article
VII.
64 Trading into the future: WTO, p.14.
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Decision-making in the WTO, as in GATT, is done by consensus.65 In cases
where consensus is not possible, the WTO Agreement allows for voting. In
such a case, decisions are made by a simple majority wherein each member
has one vote, Article IX (1). The WTO Agreement allows for four different
voting situations. First, interpretation of any covered multilateral agreement
can be adopted by a three-quarters majority of WTO members, Article IX (2).
Second, the Ministerial Conference may waive an obligation imposed on a
member by a multilateral agreement by the same majority, Article IX (3).
Third, amendments to covered multilateral agreements can be adopted by
consensus or a two-thirds majority depending on the issue, Article X.66
Finally, new members can be admitted by a two-thirds majority of the
Ministerial Conference, Article XII. When voting, some groups of members
act together with a single spokesperson, e.g. the EU. Both the EU and its
members are all WTO members in their own right, Article IX (1).
A country can become a member of the WTO if it has full autonomy in
conducting its trade policies. An applicant government must provide the
WTO with a report regarding all aspects of its trade and economic policies
concerning issues relating to WTO agreements. A working party will
examine the applicant’s trade regime while the applicant engages in bilateral
trade negotiations with interested member governments to establish
concessions and commitments under covered agreements. The result of the
negotiations and the examination is presented to the General Council or the
Ministerial Conference for adoption. New members can be accepted with a
two-thirds majority of WTO members, Article XII.67
As for GATT, the WTO’s three main tasks are to administer and implement
covered agreements, to act as a multilateral trade negotiation forum, and to
solve trade disputes, Article III (1-3).68 The WTO is also responsible for
surveillance of national trade policy through the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (TPRM), Article III (4). Reviews are conducted by the General
Council, meeting as the Trade Policy Review Body. The objectives are to
increase transparency, improve the quality of public and intergovernmental
debate, and to enable a multilateral assessment of the effects of policies on
the world trading system. This is a way to encourage members to follow
WTO rules and to fulfill their commitments under the covered agreements.
Another important task is to cooperate with other international institutions
involved in global policy-making. A Ministerial Declaration was adopted at
the Ministerial Meeting in Marrakesh in 1994 in order to achieve greater
coherence in global economic policy-making. The WTO is therefore under an
                                                
65 Consensus is defined as when no present member formally objects to a proposed decision.
66 Such amendments only apply to WTO members who accept them.
67 Trading into the future: WTO, p.14.
68 Director-General Mike Moore stated in December 1999 that although the 3rd Ministerial
Conference in Seattle was a temporary setback, the objectives of the WTO were still the
same; liberalizing trade through negotiations rounds; using trade more effectively for
economic development and poverty alleviation; confirming the central role of a rule-based
trading system; and, recognizing that the WTO truly represents the needs of its members.
http://www.wto.org/wto/seattle/english/press_e/press160.htm accessed 01/03/00.
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obligation to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank and other multilateral institutions, Article III(5).69
In order to support developing nations, the International Trade Center was
established by GATT in 1964 and is operated jointly by the WTO and the UN
(through UNCTAD). Its main task is to help developing countries promote
their exports.70
According to Sylvia Ostry, one of the major weaknesses of the WTO is that it
lacks a significant knowledge infrastructure. It does not have a secretariat of
highly qualified experts able to undertake serious policy research, as in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), IMF and
the IBRD.71
2.3.3 Overview of Legal Principles and Covered Agreements
There are many differences between GATT and the WTO. As opposed to
GATT, the WTO is a permanent organization with an institutional structure.
It covers not only trade in merchandise goods, but also trade in services and
trade-related aspects of intellectual property. The covered agreements under
the WTO are mainly multilateral and do not allow for the old GATT “à la
carte” system. In addition, the dispute settlement system is faster, more
automatic and without any possibility to block a decision.72
The WTO Agreement contains some 29 individual legal texts. Added to these
are more than 25 ministerial declarations, decisions and understandings.73
There are two major parts of the WTO Agreement. The first part contains
structural rules dealing with things like the budget, voting, membership issues
and so on. The second part contains the establishment of an “umbrella
organization”, responsible for the management of the results from the
Uruguay Round negotiations. In order to become a member of the WTO, a
country has to accept the entire result of the Uruguay Round, Article XVI (5)
WTO Agreement. This approach is known as “one single undertaking”. There
are certain exceptions to the package deal approach concerning e.g. the
plurilateral agreements that have limited membership and are administered in
an annex to the WTO Agreement. The “one single undertaking” approach is
strengthening the principle of a joint and global trading system and is a
response to the existing “GATT à la carte”.74
GATT 1994 is not a totally new agreement but basically just incorporates
GATT 1947 and agreements concluded under it. Negotiations were
                                                
69 Trading into the future: WTO, pp.4, 17. An agreement concluded in November 1996
regulates who can attend which meetings and what information can be exchanged. There is
also the possibility of consultation between secretariats on trade related issues. Ostry, p.20.
70 Trading into the future: WTO, p.16.
71 Ostry, p.23.
72 Trading into the future: WTO, p.11.
73 Trading into the future: WTO, p.5.
74 Utrikesdepartementet, pp.10-11.
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conducted on the basis of suggestions from members that certain GATT 1947
articles be inspected and overhauled. Changes made consist mainly of
interpretations and definitions of existing articles.75 In the agreement there are
guiding principles and rules in the opening paragraphs that are later used
throughout the entire text. Roughly half the articles formulate rules while the
other half formulates exceptions to the rules. When new trade areas are
negotiated and included they are also subject to the old rules and principles.76
GATT 1994 works with mutually beneficiary arrangements removing
existing barriers to trade and preventing discrimination in international
exchange of trade.77 The principle of non-discrimination is embodied in
Articles I and III GATT 1994. The first article contains the MFN clause
stating that a concession made by a member towards another member also
applies to all the other WTO members. The second article involves “national
treatment”, requiring equal treatment of imported goods and domestically-
produced goods. Another key provision is the duty-principle in Articles XI-
XIII GATT 1994. The principle entails a general prohibition of quantitative
restrictions on imports and exports. Instead, members can only resort to the
use of duties to protect their domestic industries. Such duties are to be fixed
and not subject to arbitrary raises. In general, the WTO system is more
dedicated to open, fair and undistorted competition than to free trade since
tariffs are allowed.78 Another idea behind the multilateral trading system is
stable and predictable markets. This will provide investors, employers and
consumers with a business environment that encourages trade, investment
and job creation as well as choice and low prices. This is achieved through
transparency of domestic laws, regulations and practices. Several WTO
agreements contain transparency provisions requiring disclosure at the
national or the multilateral level. The TPRM provides a further means of
encouraging transparency.79
Other important issues on the WTO agenda involve economic development
and reform, mainly in developing countries. At the Uruguay Round,
developing countries were granted a transition period to adjust to the more
unfamiliar and difficult WTO provisions. Part IV of GATT 1994 contains
three articles introduced in 1965 encouraging industrial countries to assist
developing countries in their trading conditions and not to expect reciprocity
for concessions made to developing countries in negotiations. During the
Tokyo Round in 1979 the “enabling clause” was introduced establishing the
                                                
75 Utrikesdepartementet, p.24.
76 Sjöstedt II, pp.13-14.
77 For a discussion on the efficiency of the WTO trade negotiations see Bagwell, Kyle &
Staiger, Robert, “An Economic Theory of GATT”, (National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc., Working Paper 6049, 1997), abstract (Bagwell & Staiger I). They argue that countries
can implement efficient trade agreements through reciprocity if and only if they also abide by
the principle of non-discrimination. Preferential agreements undermine the WTO’s ability to
deliver efficient multilateral outcomes through the principle of reciprocity, unless these
agreements take the form of custom unions among partners that are sufficiently similar.
78 Trading into the future: WTO, p.6.
79 Trading into the future: WTO, pp.5-6.
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Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).80 Industrialized countries granting
benefits to developing countries within the framework of a GSP do not need
to extend these concessions to other members. In addition, developing
countries may use infant industry protection, Article XVIII GATT 1994.81
Other exceptions to the general rules and principles include Articles XX and
XXI GATT 1994 containing, respectively, general and security exceptions
e.g. to protect public health, animal or plant life or to protect public morals.
Article XIV GATT 1994 contains safeguards permitting temporary
restrictions on trade under certain circumstances, e.g. during severe
imbalance in trade and payment flows.82 Anti-dumping and countervailing
duties may be used if domestic industry is severely injured, or at risk of such
injury, through the use of dumping imports, Article VI GATT 1994. Article
XVI GATT 1994 prohibits export subsidies and state aid recognizing that
state aid can injure other countries’ economic interests. Article XXIV GATT
1994 includes one of the most important exceptions allowing the creation of
regional trade agreements. This exception is in reality in conflict with the
non-discrimination principle of Articles I and III. Regional trading
arrangements may take the form of a custom union or free-trade area.
GATT 1994 covers mainly manufactured goods. But the WTO framework
also regulates trade in civilian airplanes, bovine meat, dairy products, and
government procurement through plurilateral agreements, Annex 4 WTO
Agreement. In addition, non-tariff barriers to trade e.g. anti-dumping,
subsidies, penalty duties, technical barriers to trade, custom valuation, import
licensing procedures, and other issues are also covered through different
codes and agreements, Annex 1A WTO Agreement. Other big, multilateral
agreements are GATS and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), Annex 1B, 1C WTO Agreement.83 84
Environmental issues, social policy, child labor, labor standards and unions
were not incorporated into the Uruguay agreements, but a special
environmental committee was set up to analyze environmental issues relating
to trade. Today, industrialized countries are pushing for a linkage between
these issues and multilateral trade negotiations. Developing countries see this
as a sign of growing protectionism in the industrialized world.85
                                                
80 Trading into the future: WTO, p.7.
81 Alvin, p.11.
82 It is still debated whether or not safeguards are to be used selectively or globally, i.e. if
safeguards only can be used against a country supplying the damaging import, or, if
safeguards can be used against all import of that product.
83 While GATS in general copies the rules of GATT 1947, there are three interesting aspects
of TRIPs. First, the agreement is built on minimum norms negotiated under the WIPO.
Second, there is a requirement for members to have domestic sanctions for efficient
enforcement. Third, the agreement contains explicit dispute settlement rules that the WIPO
conventions lack. In addition, there are rules on application and granting of intellectual
property rights and interim rules for developing countries
84 Utrikesdepartementet, p.32.
85 Sjöstedt I, p.34. See also footnote 50.
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3 Dispute Settlement under
GATT
The GATT dispute settlement procedure evolved from practice and was only
gradually codified. Disputes were initially examined by “working parties”,
but a move from negotiations to a more judicial procedure occurred after the
Tokyo Round in 1979 with the creation of “panels of experts”.86 Procedural
rules for the settlement of disputes were set out mainly in Articles XXII and
XXIII GATT 1947, but also in a few special provisions such as Articles
XVIII:12 and XXIV:7 GATT 1947.87 The procedure was characterized, first,
by the possibility of a settlement at all times, second, by the possibility of a
unilateral veto of decisions to form a panel, select a panel, and adopt panel
reports, and third, that the plaintiff could retaliate at any time.
A member could bring a complaint when it considered that either a benefit
accruing to it directly or indirectly under the GATT 1947 was being nullified
or impaired, or, that the attainment of any objective of the GATT 1947 was
impeded (see Table 1).88 Such NIO had to be the result of a failure of another
member to carry out its obligation under the agreement (violation
complaints), the application by another contracting party of any measure
whether or not it conflicted with the provisions of the agreement (non-
violation complaints), or the existence of any other situation that might give
rise to a NIO (situation complaints), Article XXIII:1 GATT 1947.89
Table 1: Complaints under Article XXIII:I GATT 194790
Article XXIII:1: “If any contracting party should consider that
Two causes of
action:
any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is
being nullified or impaired or
the attainment of any objective
of the Agreement is being
impeded
as the result of
“violation
complaints”:
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations
under this Agreement, or
“non-violation
complaints”:
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, or
“situation
complaints”:
(c) the existence of any other situation”…
A complaining member started out by requesting consultation with the
allegedly offending member, Article XXII GATT 1947. If this consultation
was unproductive, a plaintiff could request that the Council selected and
                                                
86 Jackson, p.166.
87 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich (ed.), “International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute
Settlement System”, (Bodmin: Kluwer Law International, 1997), (Petersmann I), p.36.
88 I will refer to nullification, impairment and impediment of an objective as NIO.
89 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, “The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System – International
Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement”, (Kluwer Law, 1997), (Petersmann
II), pp.74-75.
90 Petersmann I, p.37.
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appointed a panel, which would investigate and report its findings back to the
Council. During the investigation, the responding member had the burden of
proof that there was no violation. The panel report had to be adopted by the
Council by consensus leaving the possibility for a losing party to veto. An
adopted report was binding and the Council had the power to make
appropriate recommendations and rulings. More important was the possibility
for the Council to authorize the complaining member to suspend concessions
or obligations for the defendant, Article XXIII:2 GATT 1947 (see Table 2).91
The maximum normal length of a dispute was set at fifteen months.92
Table 2: Remedies under Article XXIII:2 GATT 194793
Article XXIII:2 “...the matter may be referred to the Contracting Parties. The
Contracting Parties shall promptly investigate any matter so referred
to them and
recommendations: shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties
which they consider to be concerned or
rulings: give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate”.
authorization to
suspend obligations:
“…they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the
application to any other contracting party or parties of such
concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances”.
                                                
91 Petersmann II, pp.74-75. Jackson, pp.166-167.
92 Nanto, Dick K., “Dispute settlement under the WTO and trade problems with Japan”, CRS
Reports for Congress, Dec. 23, 1994 (read on microfiche, no page reference available).
93 Petersmann I, p.38
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4 Dispute Settlement under the
WTO
4.1 Introduction and Overview of Changes in the
Dispute Settlement Procedure94
Dispute settlement procedures have always been an important part of the
GATT system. The Uruguay Round created a new institutional framework,
the WTO, and adopted a new Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). The DSU established, inter
alia, a unified procedure applying to a number of agreements listed in
Appendix 1 and 2 DSU (see Appendix 3 this paper).95 Under the GATT there
were up to ten different dispute settlement procedures to follow depending
upon under which agreement a dispute arose.96 In the WTO, members are
under an obligation to solve disputes over privileges and obligations under
covered agreements within the framework of the WTO dispute settlement
procedure and to follow the procedure and rules applicable.97 The key
attribute of this procedure is automatization. A WTO member can no longer
block the result of a procedure with a veto. It is a rule-oriented system,
Article 3:2 DSU, giving guidance in the way of predictable and generally
stable rules to firms around the world. This stability is important for, inter
alia, investment decisions.98 In addition, affirming that the operation of the
DSU would be strengthened by certain behavioral rules, the WTO members
signed an agreement on Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (RC) in 1996. This
agreement sets up rules of conduct for the behavior of people serving on a
panel, in the Standing Appellate Body (AB), as an arbitrator, or as an expert
participating in the dispute settlement procedure according to certain
provisions, Rule IV: 1 RC.
With the DSU, many improvements were made to the dispute settlement
procedure. The highest judiciary is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
consisting of the General Council of the WTO. A panel report is adopted
unless there is consensus not to adopt it. The US supported dropping the
consensus since it hindered effective dispute settlement, insisting instead that
an AB would be established to hear appeals.99 In addition, there is a
possibility for arbitration if the AB decision is not accepted voluntarily.
                                                
94 For an overview of the entire procedure, see Appendix 2.
95 OECD Working Papers Vol. III No. 96, “Dispute Settlement in the WTO”, p.4
96 Some agreements still have dispute settlement provisions which are regarded as lex
specialis, Article 1:2 DSU. See also section 4.2.
97 Utrikesdepartementet, p.33.
98 Jackson, pp. 162-163.
99 Jackson, p.167. Reinhardt, Eric, “Efficiency and Distribution in GATT Dispute Outcomes:
A Statistical Study”, 1995, (Reinhardt I), p.19. Nanto.
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Arbitration can also be used when there is a disagreement on the level of
compensation.100 Time frames for completion of a dispute have also become
shorter. Under the DSU, a case should not exceed 9 months from the
establishment of a panel (12 months with appeal) compared to 15 months
under the GATT. The DSU also tightened the implementation and
compensation aspect of dispute settlement. If reports, recommendations or
rulings are not implemented within a reasonable time, the responding party
must enter into negotiations over a mutually agreeable compensation scheme,
if requested. If no compensation can be agreed upon, the complaining
member has a right to request authorization to retaliate in the same trade
sector.
The DSU was built on the principles encompassed in Articles XXII and
XXIII of GATT 1947, Article 3:1 DSU.101 GATT policies and decisions
guide the WTO and the jurisprudence of GATT is thus a part of the WTO,
Article XVI:1 WTO Agreement. But since there is no stare decisis in
international law, adopted reports are not strict precedent (see also section
4.10).102 The principles guiding the WTO members and the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) include, inter alia:
• prompt settlement of disputes, Article 3:3,
• outcomes under the DSU have to conform with covered agreements and
shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to members under those
agreements, Article 3:5,
• mutually agreed solutions to formally raised matters have to be notified to
the WTO, and all members may raise any point relating thereto, Article
3:6,
• the first objective of the dispute settlement procedure is to stop the action
found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement. Compensation can be
granted pending a withdrawal, or if withdrawal is impracticable. DSB can
as a last resort suspend the application of concessions or other obligations
under the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis against the
violating member, Article 3:7,
• a breach of an obligation under a covered agreement is presumed to have
an adverse impact on other members unless infringing member can prove
otherwise, Article 3:8, and,
• the DSU does not apply retroactively, Article 3:11.
4.2 Jurisdiction and Covered agreements - lex
specialis v. lex generalis  103
The DSU applies to disputes brought under consultation and dispute
settlement provisions of agreements listed in Appendix 1 DSU, Article 1:1. It
also applies subject to special and additional rules and procedures on dispute
                                                
100 Utrikesdepartementet, p.33.
101 Unless otherwise noted, all articles in Chapter 4 refer to the DSU.
102 Jackson, pp.164, 178.
103 The concept is similar to the maxim lex posterior derogat  priori.
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settlement contained in agreements listed in Appendix 2 DSU. If there is a
discrepancy between the general rules in DSU and the special or additional
rules, the rules and procedures in Appendix 2 DSU prevails as lex specialis.
The chairman of the DSB can be requested to decide which rules or
procedures apply if there is a conflict between several special or additional
rules and procedures, Article 1:2. The DSU does not preclude members from
seeking interpretation of a covered agreement under the general provisions of
the WTO Agreement or another covered agreement that is a Plurilateral Trade
Agreement, Article 3:9. For an overview of covered agreements see
Appendix 3 of this paper.
4.3 Initiating a dispute
The DSU explicitly prefers mutually agreed solutions to a dispute and a WTO
member also has an obligation to evaluate the possibility of a fruitful action
before bringing a case, Article 3:7. Dispute are initiated following the rules of
Article XXIII:1 GATT 1994 (see section 3). Violation claims are those where
a measure causing a NIO is in conflict with an explicit provision of a covered
agreement. Non-violation claims are more complex. The basis is reciprocal
concessions negotiated between two trading parties where a subsequent
action by one party, that could not have been reasonably anticipated at the
time of the negotiations, although consistent with covered agreements,
adversely affected the market access afforded to its trading party.104 Situation
complaints are any other situation where a NIO occurs. The two latter types
of claims could be interpreted as a general clause indicating that there might
be measures not violating covered agreements that are in conflict with some
general principle of fairness. According to John Jackson, Article 3:2 indicates
an adherence to judicial restraint. But there is an inherent conflict between
this and the ambiguity in non-violation cases. When a WTO member moves
for a non-violation case there will automatically be a conflict with Article 3:2
since recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreement.105
4.3.1 Consultation, Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation
A plaintiff has a duty to use consultation in good faith before bringing a
dispute before a panel by requesting consultation with the defendant, Article
4:2, 5.106 The plaintiff can directly request the establishment of a panel if
consultation has not been able to start after a certain time limit, Article 4:3.107
                                                
104 Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., “Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral
Opportunism and the rules of GATT, (National Bureau of Economic Research, inc., Working
Paper 70/71, 1999), p.3 (Bagwell & Staiger II).
105 Jackson, pp.172-173
106 I will let plaintiff denote the member bringing a complaint, and defendant the allegedly
infringing member. This denotation does not reflect any assignment of guilt on my behalf.
107 Defendant has to reply to a request within10 days of receiving it and shall enter into
consultation within 30 days of that same date. If defendant fails to do so, the plaintiff can
request the formation of a panel, Article 4:3. See Appendix 2.
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Consultation is confidential and without prejudice to the rights of any
member in any further proceedings, Article 4:6. This provision, commonly
used throughout the DSU, makes sure that consultation is not seen as just an
obligatory obstacle on the way to panel proceedings. Instead, parties to a
dispute can negotiate in good faith in order to reach a mutually acceptable
solution in the spirit of Article 3:7 at the same time as they know that if the
negotiations fail, the result will not affect their rights in subsequent panel
proceedings. If consultation fails to settle the matter within 60 days after the
receipt of the request for consultation, the plaintiff may request the
establishment of a panel, Article 4:7.108 Under certain circumstances, other
WTO members can join the consultation if they have a “substantial trade
interest” related to the consultation in progress, Article 4:11.109
Members may also request good offices, conciliation and mediation at any
time during a dispute, Article 4:3. While consultation is mandatory and is the
first step in resolving a dispute, these other measures are voluntary and can be
used during any stage of the dispute settlement proceedings. This is well in
line with the spirit of the DSU to promote mutually acceptable solutions,
Article 3:7. These voluntary proceedings are confidential and without
prejudice to the rights of any party in any further proceedings (see also
consultation, above), Article 4:1-2.
4.4 The Panel and Panel Proceedings
Formation of a panel must be requested in writing to the DSB by a party to a
dispute, Article 6:1, 2. A panel normally consists of three panelists, but
parties to a dispute can also agree upon using a five-panelist panel, Article
8:5.110 The panelists are nominated by the WTO Secretariat from a list of
well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, Article
8:1, 4, 6.111 Parties to a dispute can only oppose a nomination of a panelist for
compelling reasons, Article 8:6.112 If there is no agreement on the panelists
within 20 days of the date of the establishment of a panel, the Director-
General determines the composition of the panel, Article 8:7.113 Panelists
should have a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of
                                                
108 Regarding perishable goods the members have to enter into consultation within 10 days,
and have settled within 20 days. Parties have a duty to accelerate the process in such cases,
Article 4:8-9.
109 What constitutes a ”substantial trade interest” is unclear.
110 The reasons for this might be highly strategic. Theories about decision making in groups
have been debated by the Supreme Court of the United States of America concerning the
appropriate number of jurors, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). This would be an
interesting question for future research.
111 An individual is qualified if he, for example, has served on or presented a case to a panel,
has teaching experience in international trade law or policy, or has been a senior trade policy
official for a WTO member.
112 Unfortunately, I have not been able to find any indications on what such compelling
reasons might be. It may entail some important government interest. Further research is
needed.
113 This occurs only upon request of either party and in consultation with the Chairman of
DSB and the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee.
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experience. Their independence is important and panelists serve
independently from their governments, Article 8:2, 9 (see section 4.8 for rules
of conduct). Therefore, citizens of parties to a dispute can only serve on that
panel if there is an agreement between the parties involved, Article 8:3.
A panel should make an objective assessment of the issue brought before it.
This includes an evaluation of the facts, the applicability of and conformity
with the relevant covered agreements, and any other finding that may
facilitate a decision by the DSB. Throughout its investigation, the panel
should consult with the parties in order to reach a mutually acceptable
solution, Article 11. The idea to promote mutually acceptable solutions
throughout the DSU is most likely meant to facilitate enforcement and to
make sure that members adhere to the covered agreements. Each panel has a
right to seek expert information and technical advice from any individual or
body. There is also a possibility to establish certain expert review groups in
order to compile an advisory report, Article 13, Appendix 4 DSU.
The panel has to work according to principles similar to an ordinary court
hearing broadly defined in a special Working Procedure, Article 12:1,
Appendix 3 DSU. Meetings are closed sessions and parties, and others, can
only be present when invited by the panel. Panel deliberations and documents
submitted are confidential. Before the first meeting, the parties submit their
presentation of the facts and arguments in writing. During the first meeting,
the plaintiff presents his case followed by the defendant. Formal rebuttals are
made during the second meeting in the reverse order. All oral statements are
to be submitted in writing as well, and the panel may question the parties at
any time. Parties are to be present during hearing of the opposing party to the
dispute, Appendix 3:2-5, 6-10 DSU.
The panel’s final report is ”constructed” in stages, providing ample time for
review by the parties. First, the descriptive section (facts and arguments
presented by the parties) is issued to the parties directly after the proceedings
before the panel. After considering comments by the parties, the panel
circulates a complete interim report, including findings and conclusions.
Parties can once again submit written comments and even request an extra
meeting to discuss specific issues. In the final report to the DSB, the panel
also includes a presentation of the review proceeding, Article 15. The report
includes factual findings, the legal rules applicable, and the rationale for its
findings and recommendations. A short report has to be written even if the
parties to a dispute reach a mutually acceptable solution, Article 12:7. Panel
deliberations are confidential and the parties to a dispute cannot be present
during the drafting of the report. Like in the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
but unlike in the US Supreme Court, such reports are anonymous, Article 14.
A likely reason for this is that panelist serve as representatives of the WTO
and not in their individual capacity. As such, they must create an image of
outward unity in order to avoid “retaliation” on them or their country of
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origin. In addition, panelists have tenure limited to the dispute in question.114
It seems unlikely that the fact that a panelists in the past have been part of
panels that have issued, in some WTO members eyes, unfavorable reports
would constitute compelling reasons for opposing the nomination of that
same panelist for a future panel in the sense of Article 8:6. This might instead
be a reason for initiating the procedure prescribed by the RC for questioning
the impartiality of a panelist (see section 4.8).
Panel proceedings are generally not to be longer than six months from the
date a panel is successfully constructed to the date a panel report is issued to
the parties to the dispute. In a dispute concerning perishable goods the time
limit is three months, Article 12:8. Even if these time constraints cannot be
honored, a procedure can normally not be longer than nine months, Article
12:9. But proceedings before a panel can be suspended at the request of the
complaining party for up till twelve months, Article 12:12.
4.5 The Dispute Settlement Body
The DSB has the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and AB reports,
maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendation, and
authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered
agreements, Article 2:1. Recommendations and rulings cannot add to or
diminish rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements, Article
3:2. Decisions are made by consensus meaning that an agreement is reached
unless a member present at the meeting of the DSB formally objects to it,
Article 2:4.
A panel report should not be considered for adoption until 20 days after its
circulation to the WTO members. Written objections by WTO members must
be circulated at least 10 days prior to the relevant DSB meeting. The parties
to the dispute have a right to participate fully in DSB meetings. The report
should be adopted within 60 days of the date of circulation unless the
decision of the panel will be appealed or the DSB decides not to adopt it. An
appealed report will be considered again after the completion of the appellate
procedure, Article 16.115 Note that panel reports were adopted by consensus
under GATT while reports under the DSU are considered adopted unless the
DSB by consensus decides not to adopt it.
                                                
114 The Justices of the ECJ have a limited tenure while the US Supreme Court Justices serve
for life.
115 For a statistical analysis of dispute length depending on case type, see Reinhardt, Eric,
“Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation 1948-
1999” (Reinhardt II).
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4.6 Joint Rules for Panels and the Appellate
Body
4.6.1 Procedural Rules
Several disputes related to each other can be examined cumulatively by a
single panel. Even if several panels are established in such a case, the
individuals serving as panelists should, if possible, be the same on the
different panels, Article 9:1, 3. The DSU protects the interest of “third party
WTO members” during a panel process. Such members with a “substantial
interest” in a dispute have the possibility to be heard by the panel and make
written submissions to it. If an ongoing panel process leads to a NIO for a
“third party WTO member” (see Article 3.2), they can initiate new dispute
settlement proceedings under the DSU. The related dispute shall if possible
be heard by the same panel, Article 10:1-2, 4. The entire dispute settlement
procedure should normally not exceed nine months from the establishment of
a panel to the adoption of the report by the DSB. If a panel report is appealed,
the time limit is twelve months.116 There is also a possibility for granting both
panels and the AB more time if they request so in writing to the DSB, Article
20. Written submissions to the panel or the AB are confidential. Members
have an obligation to respect the confidentiality of information disclosed by
other members. In order to prevent abuse of confidentiality, and in the interest
of the public, a member can request a party to the dispute to provide a non-
confidential summary of its submissions, Article 18:2.117 In the report, a
panel or the AB should recommend members to bring disputed measures in
conformity with covered agreements and may also make suggestions on how
to implement a recommendation. The panel and the AB can never add or
diminish the rights or obligations provided in the covered agreements, Article
3:2, 19. Interpretation of covered agreements is made in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law, Article 3:2.118
4.6.2 Rules of Conduct for Panelists, Appellate Body
members, Arbitrators and Experts
The Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (RC) was adopted in December
                                                
116 Parties to a dispute can always agree upon extending the time limits. Shorter time limits
may apply in disputes regarding perishable goods.
117 The interest of the public is in conflict with the interest of the state to conceal its strategies
from its ”competitors”. This problem is common in most inter-governmental organizations.
The debate is especially strong within the EU where Nordic countries, among others,  are
demanding more transparency in order to gain the public’s trust. The lack of publicity may
otherwise make the citizens suspicious of what is going on in the organization at the same
time as it is harder to ”check” that organization. See also section 4.11.
118 Jackson, p.168. Petersmann II, pp.111-112. This was stated in the first AB report ”US
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline”, WT/DS2/1, 1996. GATT and
WTO are thus subject to Article 31:3(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(1969).
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1996.119 It consists mainly of provisions to ensure the “integrity, impartiality
and confidentiality of proceedings under the DSU thereby enhancing
confidence in the new dispute settlement mechanism”, Rule I RC. The RC
does not modify the rights and obligations of members under the DSU nor the
rules and procedures in it, Rule II RC. It is interesting to note, however, the
total confidentiality surrounding the proceedings in dispute settlement, and
above all, the proceedings involving possible violation of the RC. This total
lack of transparency is somewhat necessary but also very alarming.
The RC applies to individuals serving on panels, on the AB120, as an
arbitrator, as an expert, and also as a member of the WTO Secretariat (the
latter three pursuant to certain provisions in covered agreements), Rule IV:1
RC. These covered individuals have to be independent and impartial. They
shall also avoid direct and indirect conflicts of interest and respect the
confidentiality of proceedings, Rules II-III RC. In addition, each covered
individual shall consider only issues “raised in, and necessary to fulfill their
responsibilities” within the proceedings.121 There is no possibility to delegate
this responsibility to another person. In the same provision there is a
prohibition on accepting benefits or incurring obligations that may
jeopardize, or “give rise to justifiable doubts” as to that person’s proper
performance, Rule III:2 RC.
Covered individuals are under obligation to disclose any information that they
can “reasonably be expected to know” “that is likely to affect, or give rise to
justifiable doubts” about their own independence or impartiality, Rules III:1,
VI:1-2 RC. Examples of such information are listed in the Illustrative List of
Information to be Disclosed. This list includes information about a covered
individual’s financial interests, professional interests, interests in
organizations relevant to the dispute in question, personal opinions, and
employment or family interests, Annex 2 RC. A covered individual is
obligated to disclose information only at the time when it is likely to have any
effect, or may give rise to doubts, as to their independence or impartiality.
But, during a dispute, new relevant information is to be disclosed at the
earliest time that a covered individual becomes aware of it, Rule VI:2, 5 RC.
In order to live up to these obligations, covered individuals (with some
exceptions) have to sign a disclosure statement, Rule VI:4, Annex 3 RC. All
information revealed through the disclosure process is confidential, Rules
VI:6, VIII:20 RC. The references to “reasonably expected to know” and
“likely to affect, or give rise to justifiable doubts” seem to give ample room
for discretion about whether or not to disclose relevant information. Since
                                                
119 http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/rc.htm accessed 04/15/99.
120 Special rules of conduct exist in the Working Procedures for Appellate Review (WP). See
section 4.7.3.
121 This seems to mean that AB members can only base the outcome on facts presented by the
parties to a dispute. Disputes under the WTO should be compared to civil litigation in
domestic countries. Most legal traditions accept that civil litigation is the responsibility of the
litigants, not the judges. Compare this to the possibility (and in some cases obligation) of
judicial intervention in criminal proceedings, sua sponte. In Sweden, the latter is represented
by the “officialprincipen” encompassed in, inter alia, The Code of Judicial Procedure
1942:740 (Rättegångsbalk), 30:3§, 46:4§ and 35:6§.
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only information that could have a possible effect on the proceedings is
interesting, the latter expression is the most important. The first problem is
the word “likely”. How likely does this effect have to be? Does it have to be
evident, or is it enough with a suspicion? The second problem involves the
expression “justifiable doubts”. It seems to indicate that the doubts cast on an
individual’s impartiality must be justified by some objective standard.
Theoretically it is clear that a person could remain totally independent and
impartial although he is dealing with something concerning his own interests.
With a combination of a structural and teleological interpretation of the
provision it is possible to reach a suitable solution. First, the purpose of the
entire RC is to make sure that covered individuals are independent and
impartial. Second, a covered individual has to disclose of relevant
information for this purpose. Third, it is then up to the AB to examine the
disclosed information and take appropriate steps. This leads me to conclude
that covered individuals are under a heavy obligation to disclose all
information that might be relevant. It thus seems to be better to disclose too
much rather than too little. There is, however, a built in limitation in the RC
stating that only information significant to the issues considered in the
proceedings are relevant. The AB also has to respect the need for personal
privacy and make sure that the rules are not so administratively burdensome
as to make it impracticable for otherwise qualified individuals to serve on a
dispute, Rule VI:3 RC.
Any party to a dispute that knows of evidence of a material violation of the
obligations under the RC must at the earliest possible time submit them to the
Chair of the DSB, the Director-General or the Standing Appellate Body in a
written statement specifying the relevant facts and circumstances. Other
WTO members who have such information may provide the information to
the parties to the dispute, Rule VIII:1 RC. It is interesting to note that parties
with an interest in the dispute are under an obligation to act while other WTO
members are not. Of course, a party that may benefit from e.g. an impartial
panelist may not want to submit such evidence. But, under this provision they
will have to do so. Perhaps a better solution would be to have all WTO
members under an obligation to submit such information in the interest of
securing the integrity of the dispute settlement system.
Evidence presented based on an alleged failure of a covered individual to
disclose relevant information will only lead to a disqualification if there also
is evidence of a material violation of the obligation of independence,
impartiality, confidentiality, or the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and that
the dispute settlement mechanism would be impaired by it, Rule VIII:2. For
such a challenge to be successful, it is necessary to present evidence of three
types: first, a failure to disclose relevant information, second, a material
violation of the impartiality obligations, and third, that the dispute settlement
procedure would be impaired by these first two breaches. This provision
seems to be somewhat lacking in logic. It is, of course, a safeguard to make
sure that not all failures to disclose relevant information disqualify a covered
individual. But, it is at the same time odd to note that when a covered
individual has failed to disclose relevant information making him partial, he
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can only be disqualified if his impartiality would also impair the dispute
settlement mechanism. The mere fact that a covered individual has violated
the obligations of impartiality would raise serious doubts over that person’s
capacity to serve in a dispute settlement body. But how this would effect the
dispute settlement mechanism is hard to estimate. A covered individual’s
partiality might of course not impair the proceedings, but at the same time, it
might. How evident must this impairment be, and when does it have to be
evident? A better solution would have been to automatically disqualify all
covered individuals who violate the obligation of impartiality.
A specified investigation process shall be completed within fifteen working
days after evidence has been submitted. Matters involving the possible
material violation of the RC should be resolved as expeditiously as possible
in order not to delay the proceedings under the DSU. This process works
somewhat differently depending on who the person subject to the allegation
is. If the “suspect” is a panelist, an arbitrator or an expert, evidence is
submitted to the Chair of the DSB. This evidence is also communicated to the
“suspect”. If the matter is not resolved after consultation with the “suspect”,
all evidence and information is to be provided to the parties to the dispute.
The Chair of the DSB in consultation with the Director-General creates a
disciplinary “court” consisting of a sufficient number of Chairs of the
relevant Council or Councils to provide an odd number. The “suspect” and
parties to the dispute then have a reasonable opportunity to be heard before
the “court” can decide whether a material violation of the RC has occurred.
The person in question will continue to participate in the dispute proceedings
unless a material violation has occurred. The Chair of the DSB shall
thereafter take the necessary steps to revoke the appointment of that
individual, or excuse him from the dispute, Rule VIII:4-10, 19 RC. If the
“suspect” is a member of the WTO Secretariat, evidence is provided to the
Director-General. He will inform the “suspect” and other relevant individuals.
The Director-General then takes appropriate measures in accordance with the
Staff Regulations. This includes consultation with the person in question and,
if applicable, appropriate disciplinary action. A decision is communicated to
parties to the dispute, the panel and the Chair of the DSB, Rule VIII:11-13
RC. If the person in question is a member of the AB, or its staff, a party to the
dispute has to provide the other party with the evidence, and then the AB.
The AB then provides the “suspect” with the evidence and can take any
appropriate action after giving the “suspect” a chance to be heard. The AB
decision shall be communicated to the parties to the dispute and to the chair
of the DSB, Rule VIII:14-17 RC. Replacements for vacancies, other than in
the AB, occurring after completion of the procedure in Rules VIII:5-17 RC,
are appointed through the procedure for initial appointment specified in the
DSU, e.g. Article 8.122 For the AB, using the rotation system, the next AB
member in line will automatically be assigned to the appeal. Working
procedures for the panel, the AB or the arbitrator examining the dispute, can
be modified after consultation with the parties to the dispute, Rule VIII:18
RC.
                                                
122 The time constraints for this are half the specified time periods in the DSU.
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All information concerning possible or actual violations of the RC shall be
kept confidential except to the extent necessary to carry out a decision made
under the RC, Rule VIII:20 RC. Dispute settlement deliberations and
proceedings, as well as any other information identified by a party to a
dispute as confidential, are confidential. Covered individuals are obligated to
respect this confidentiality and not to use information acquired during
proceedings or deliberations to gain personal advantage or give an advantage
to others, Rule VII:1 RC. During proceedings, covered individuals are
prohibited from having ex parte contacts concerning matters under
consideration. Participating covered individuals are also prohibited from
commenting on proceedings or issues in dispute before a report has been
derestricted, Rule VII:2 RC.
Obviously, the integrity of proceedings and the work within panels and the
AB is well protected. One of the reasons for this is to promote the disclosure
of relevant information by the parties. Especially since the panelists and AB
members are prohibited from taking initiatives outside the framework created
by the litigants according to Rule III:2. Disputes almost always involve
domestic trade policy clashes between two or more members. Information
disclosed may well include sensitive details of domestic interest and
information concerning private businesses in a specific country. Another
reason for this secrecy is the concern for the impartiality of individuals
serving in an “adjudicating position”. It is worth recalling that members of,
e.g., panels are chosen from a list maintained by the WTO Secretariat, Article
8 DSU. The list consist of well-qualified governmental and non-
governmental individuals and, in the interest of impartiality, citizens of WTO
members that are parties to the dispute cannot serve on the panel unless
agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, Article 8:3. There is, however, a
risk for future “retaliation” against a panelist (e.g.), or even against the
country that he is from (although members of dispute settlement bodies serve
in their individual capacity). On the other hand, this confidentiality is part of
the transparency problem identified within the WTO (see section 4.11). The
prohibition in Rule VII:1, on the other hand, concerning use of acquired
information for personal, or other’s gain, is well in line with the general idea
of preserving integrity. The question is how far this prohibition stretches.
There has been similar concern within the Commission of the European
Union. In the wake of scandals of alleged nepotism, corruption and
misconduct among commissioners and civil servants attached to the
Commission, a Code of Conduct for Commissioners123 was adopted in the
spring of 1999.124
                                                
123 http://europa.eu.int/comm/reform/formation/commis_en.pdf accessed 10/28/99.
124 Among other things, a commissioner was prohibited from publishing a diary that criticized
certain commissioners and the work of the Commission.
http://sydsvenskan.se/red./v9/03eu.html accessed 10/28/99.
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4.7 The Appellate Body and Appellate Review
4.7.1 Organization
The Standing Appellate Body (AB) is mainly regulated by the DSU and the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review (WP).125 The latter may be
amended by the AB in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the
Director-General, Rule 32(2) WP. If amendments are made to the DSU or
other covered agreements, the AB shall examine whether amendment to the
WP is also necessary, Rule 32(3) WP.
The DSB is responsible for establishing and appointing the seven-member
AB. Each member is appointed for a four-year term with one optional
renewal term. Together, they shall be representative of the membership in the
WTO. Like in the panels, AB members must possess demonstrated expertise
in law, international trade and the covered agreements in general, Article
17:2-3. They must act independently and cannot take instructions from any
international, governmental, or non-governmental organization or any private
source. In addition, members of the AB are prohibited from employment or
professional activity inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities, Article
17.3 DSU, Rule 2:2-3 WP. This requirement is somewhat different from the
one regulating conflicts of interests in the RC. The latter seemingly only
applies to conflict of interests related to the dispute in question while the
provisions in the DSU and the WP deal with such conflicts in a more general
way. One reason for this difference may be that the AB consists of permanent
members always under an obligation to avoid conflicts of interest while a
panel, for instance, is a temporary body and its members thus only subject to
this restriction while they serve on the panel in question. AB members have
to be available at all times and on short notice and must therefore keep the
WTO Secretariat informed of their whereabouts at all times, Article 17.3
DSU, Rule 2:4 WP.
4.7.2 Working Procedures for the Appellate Body
The Chairman of the AB is elected for one year by the other AB members.
No member can serve for more than one year consecutively. The Chairman is
in charge of the “overall direction” of the AB, including in particular
supervision of the internal functioning of the AB and any other duties that the
other AB members may entrust him with. Temporary absence or incapacity of
the elected Chairman is filled by an interim Chairman with full capability
authorized by the AB. In case of a permanent vacancy, the AB members elect
a new chairman for a full term, Rule 5 WP.
Appeals are heard and decided by a division of the AB consisting of three out
of the seven members in accordance with Article 17:3. A division is selected
                                                
125 http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/ab3.htm accessed 04/15/99
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based on rotation, Rule 6(1-2) WP. The AB members of the division choose a
Presiding Member responsible for coordinating the overall conduct of the
proceedings, chairing all oral hearings and meetings related to the appeal, and
coordinating the drafting of the appellate report, Rule 7 WP.
Decisions concerning an appeal are made by the division of the AB assigned
to it. Other decisions are made by the entire AB. The AB and its divisions
shall “make every effort” to make their decisions by consensus. When
consensus cannot be reached, the matter is decided by a majority vote, Rule 3
WP.
A member selected to serve on a division can be excused if there is justifiable
doubts over the impartiality or independence of that individual, or evidence
of a material violation of the obligations in Rule VIII RC has been presented,
Rule 6(3)(i) WP (see also 4.8 and 4.6.3). A member can also be excused due
to illness or other serious reasons after notifying the Chairman of the AB and
the Presiding Member, Rule 6(3)(ii) WP. Such information is also
communicated to the AB, Rule 12 WP. Finally, a member can also be
excused if he is resigning from the AB (see below), Rule 6(3)(iii) WP.
Replacements are selected through rotation, Rule 13 WP.
Resignations are notified in writing to the Chairman of the AB who then
informs the Chairman of the DSB, the Director-General and the other AB
members. A resignation takes effect 90 days after the notification unless the
DSB in consultation with the AB decides otherwise, Rule 14 WP. This
provision must mean that it is possible for the resignation to have effect both
sooner or later depending on mutually acceptable solutions. However, it
seems highly unlikely that a resigning AB member can be forced to stay
longer than the 90 days prescribed by the WP. The resigning member can still
complete any appeal in which he took part with the authorization of the AB
and upon notification to the DSB. The resigning member is then considered
being a member of the AB for that purpose only, Rule 15 WP.
The members of the AB are under an obligation to convene on a regular basis
in order to discuss matters of policy, practice and procedure. They also have
to be well informed on dispute settlement and other activities of the WTO.
Each member shall receive all documents filed in an appeal. Before an
appellate report is finalized and circulated to the WTO member, the division
hearing the appeal has to exchange views with the other AB members.126 But
this obligation does not interfere with that division’s authority to hear and
decide appeals under Article 17 DSU, Rule 4 WP. These rules seem to
express a will to establish WTO precedent and conformity (see section 4.10).
                                                
126 A member who has been excused from a division for some reason cannot take part in the
exchange of views, Rule 11.
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4.7.3 Special Rules of Conduct for the Appellate Body
When a Notice of Appeal is filed, each member of the division handling the
proceedings has to review the factual portion of the panel report and then
disclose of any information that might be a reason for them not to participate
pursuant to Rule VI:4(b)(i) RC and Rule 9(1) WP. Each member must respect
the obligations of independence, impartiality or confidentiality of the
proceedings and avoid direct or indirect conflicts of interest, which may
impair the impartiality, or confidentiality of the dispute settlement
mechanism, Rule VIII RC. It is then up to the AB to consider whether the
information disclosed excuses the member from being part of the division
hearing the appeal, Rules 6(3)(i), 9(4) WP.
Evidence of a material violation of the obligations laid down in Rule VIII RC
has to be filed after the party to the dispute knew or reasonably could have
known of the facts supporting it. In no case shall such evidence be filed after
the appellate report is circulated to the WTO members, Rule 10(2) WP. If
evidence is not submitted at the earliest practicable time, a written
explanation of why a delay occurred has to be submitted. It is then up to the
discretion of the AB to decide whether or not to consider the evidence, Rule
10(3) WP. Such evidence is confidential and must be supported by affidavits
by individuals having actual knowledge or a reasonable belief as to the truth
of the facts stated, Rule 10(1). When evidence of a material violation is
submitted, the appeal is suspended for fifteen days or until the AB’s
investigation of the matter pursuant to Rule VIII:14-16 RC is concluded, or
whichever is earlier, Rule 10(4). Actions available to the AB during an
investigation under the RC include to dismiss the allegations, to excuse the
member in question from a division, or make any other orders it deems
necessary, Rule 10(5). AB members submitting information under the self-
disclosure provisions of the RC and WP can, of course, not take part in the
evaluation of such information. Excused members of a division, and
members that would have been excused from a division had they been
selected, can not take part in the exchange of views conducted according to
Rule 4:3 WP, Rule 11 WP.
4.7.4 The appeal
Panel cases can only be appealed by parties to the dispute, although third
parties with a “substantial interest” in the dispute under Article 10:2 DSU
may make written submissions to the AB. Such third parties can also be
heard, Article 17:4 DSU. Appeals are limited to issues of law covered in the
panel report and interpretations developed by the panel, Article 17:6 DSU. In
the report, the AB must address each of the issues raised in the appeal, Article
17:12 DSU.127
                                                
127 There is thus no possibility for the AB to avoid answering legal problems. A similar
concept is encompassed in Article 66 of the French Constitution prohibiting arbitrary denial
of justice. Compare this to the debate surrounding the ECJ regarding case C-189/95 Franzén
where it appeared that the ECJ did not answer the legal question posted.
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The rules governing the appellate procedure start out with an interesting
reference to equity and fairness. Procedural questions not regulated by the
WP can be dealt with in an ad hoc fashion by the division handling the
appeal. Such a decision is only valid for the proceedings in question and must
be consistent with the covered agreements. Also, there is a possibility for
exceptions concerning time limits128 in “exceptional circumstances” when
strict adherence to the rules would result in a “manifest unfairness”. In both
of these cases a decision must be communicated to the people involved in the
appeal as well as the other members of the AB, Rule 16(1-2) WP. It is worth
noting that the ad hoc solution only applies to procedural matters. This is
important since the DSB cannot issue recommendations and rulings that add
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in covered agreements,
Article 3:2 DSU. At the same time, solutions to formally raised dispute
matters shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any WTO member
under covered agreements, nor impede the attainment of any objective of
those agreements, Article 3:5 DSU. The same rules apply to time limits. But
while it is hard to see that procedural rules may cause damaged in the sense
of Article 3:2 and 5 DSU, it is more likely that time limits may infringe upon
these rules. But is such an infringement allowable? The question is whether
the “exceptional circumstances” and “manifest unfairness” is judged from
one party’s view, or from a total cost-benefit analysis for all involved in the
dispute. This is so since something might be “manifestly unfair” for one party
but by correcting this unfairness, the other party is subject to the same
“manifest unfairness”. In conclusion, exception or ad hoc procedural rule
cannot violate Articles 3:2 and 3:5 DSU. It is worth keeping in mind that
there are already rules allowing for accelerated proceedings in cases of
urgency, including those concerning perishable goods, rule 26(3) WP, Article
4:9 DSU.
Documents are considered filed when received by the AB Secretariat within
specified time limits. They are automatically served on other people129
involved in the appeal by the most expeditious means of delivery or
communication available. Clerical errors in submissions may be corrected
within three days of the original filing upon authorization by the division in
question. A revised copy has to be filed with the AB Secretariat and served
on the other involved people, Rule 18 WP. All documentation is
automatically served on all members of the division hearing the dispute, Rule
4(2) WP.
An appeal is considered commenced when a party to a dispute formally
notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal and simultaneously files a Notice of
Appeal with the AB Secretariat, Rule 20(1) WP, Article 16:4 DSU. The
Director-general of the WTO then transmits the complete record of the panel
proceedings to the AB, Rule 25 WP. The Notice of Appeal consists mainly of
                                                
128 Special rules apply to the calculation of time limits, Rule 17 WP.
129 ”People involved in the appeal” refers to parties to the dispute, participants, third parties
and third participants. For a definition see Rule 1 WP.
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administrative information where the most important part is a brief statement
of the nature of the appeal including the “allegations of errors in the issues of
law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the
panel”, Rule 20(2) WP. Within ten days of filing a Notice of Appeal, the
appellant has to file a written submission with the AB Secretariat containing a
precise statement of the grounds of the appeal stated in the Notice of Appeal,
legal arguments and sources in support of this, and the ruling sought, Rule 21
WP. An appellee may file a response to an appellant’s submissions with the
AB Secretariat within 25 days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The
appellee’s submission must contain reasons, and legal support, for opposing
the appellant’s arguments, an acceptance or opposition to each ground set out
in the appellant’s submission, and the ruling sought, Rule 22 WP. There is
also a possibility for other parties to the dispute to join an appeal, or appeal
on other grounds than the original appellant. A multiple appeal must be filed
in the format required by Rule 21 WP within 15 days after the filing of the
Notice of Appeal, Rule 23(1-2) WP. The response to a multiple appeal must
be filed in the format required by Rule 22 WP within 25 days of the filing of
the Notice of Appeal, Rule 23(3). The time limit of the multiple appeals rule
does not preclude a party to a dispute to appeal pursuant Article 16:4 DSU,
Article 23(4) WP. This provision seems to expand the possibilities for
appeals in cases where time limits for multiple appeals have expired.
According to Article 16:4 DSU a panel report shall be adopted by the DSB
within 60 days of circulation to the members unless it is appealed (or not
adopted). In a case where a party does appeal, by notifying the DSB in
writing and submitting a Notice of Appeal with the AB Secretariat, the
adoption process in the DSB is halted in anticipation of the AB report. The
appellant then make submissions in accordance with Rule 21(2) WP. If
another party to the dispute decides to appeal he can still do so according to
Rule 23(4) WP, even though he is not following the multiple appeals
procedure in Rule 23(1) WP. This must mean that a party to a dispute who
wants to appeal a panel report after an appeal has already been started can do
so even though the time limit for multiple appeals in Rule 23(1) WP has
expired. Such an appeal must then conform to Article 16:4 DSU which
requires an individual Notice of Appeal for each appellant using Article 16:4
DSU. All related appeals will be examined by the same division, Rule 23
WP. A third party who wishes to take part in the appeal must file a written
submission stating the grounds and legal arguments in support of its position
within 25 days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal, Rule 24 WP. Such third
participants may also make oral arguments or presentations at the oral hearing
of the appeal, Rule 27(3) WP.
The division handling the dispute draws up a working schedule after the
commencement of an appeal. The schedule contains dates for filing
documents and a timetable for the division’s work, including dates for oral
hearing if possible. In appeals of urgency, for example dealing with
perishable goods, the AB shall “make every effort” to accelerate the
proceedings, Rule 26 WP. Oral hearings are normally held 30 days after the
filing of a Notice of Appeal. The AB Secretariat notifies the people involved
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of the date of the oral hearings. Oral arguments and presentations may be
time-limited by the Presiding Member, Rule 27(1-2,4) WP.
The division can address questions orally or in writing at any time during the
proceedings. They can also request additional memoranda from any
participant or third participant and specify the time period by which written
responses or memoranda shall be received. Questions, responses and
memoranda are available to other people in the appeal who also have a right
to respond, Rule 28 WP. A division and its members can only meet with or
contact participants and third participants in the presence of the other
participants and third participants. Members of a division are also prohibited
from discussing aspects of the appeal with participants and third participants
in the absence of the other members of the division. Members of the AB not
serving on the division are prohibited from discussing the appeal with any
participant or third participant, Rule 19 WP.
If a submission is not filed within the required time periods or a participant
fails to appear at the oral hearing, the division shall issue appropriate orders,
including dismissal of the appeal, after hearing the views of the participants,
Rule 29 WP. The appellant may withdraw the appeal at any time by notifying
the AB, who in turn notifies the DSB. Mutually agreed solutions under
Article 3:6 DSU are reported to the DSB, who notifies the AB, Rule 30 WP.
The proceedings before the AB are confidential.  The report is anonymous
and drafted without the presence of the parties, Article 17:10-11 DSU. An
appellate report should normally be circulated to the WTO members before
60 days, and never later than 90 days, after an appeal, Article 17:5. The report
should be adopted by the DSB within thirty days of circulation unless the
DSB decides by consensus not to adopt it, Article 17:14 DSU. The AB may
uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel,
Article 17:13 DSU, but it may not remand a dispute back to the panel in
question. Remand power is otherwise generally used in domestic court
systems and within the EU. From a law and economics point of view, remand
power is necessary to keep costs down and to prevent overloading higher
courts with improperly made decisions. From a jurisprudence point of view,
remand power is a way of making sure that the appellate system is truly
working. Without remand power, an appellate court will in essence have to
act as a primary court in cases where a lower court’s decision should have
been remanded. The appellant will thus in reality lose an opportunity to
appeal since he normally would have been entitled to a re-examination of the
case by the lower court, and then a new appeal to the AB. This lack of
remand power is thus a serious flaw of the WTO dispute settlement system. A
possible explanation for this might be the ad hoc character of the WTO
panels. Panels are dissolved after issuing their reports and would therefore
require some administrative effort to be recreated for remand proceedings,
even if a totally new panel was created. Another possible explanation is that
the WTO dispute settlement system is a “private” system within an
international organization. The speedy settlement of disputes is of utmost
importance and remand power would therefore slow down the system.
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Finally, even though the AB lacks remand power, it still represents a
possibility for a re-examination of a panel report. This must still be seen as an
improvement compared to the GATT system.
4.8 Enforcement of Rulings and
Recommendations
When a measure violating an agreement has been found, there is a legal
obligation to not merely compensate the WTO member experiencing the NIO
but to stop the measure in question. There is no obligation to withdraw a
measure in non-violation cases, Article 22:8.130 A “losing” WTO member has
to report its plan of compliance with recommendations and rulings at a DSB
meeting 30 days after the adoption of the report in question. If it is not
possible to implement recommendations and rulings immediately, a WTO
member can be granted a reasonable time limit to comply. A reasonable time
limit can be determined either by a proposal by the WTO member concerned,
that is approved by the DSB, by an agreement between the parties to the
dispute 45 days after the adoption of the report, or, by arbitration within 90
days. In case of arbitration, a reasonable time is normally less than 15 months
after adoption of a report, Article 21:3. A time limit to comply should
normally be agreed upon before 15 months from the date of the establishment
of the panel. If the panel or the AB have been granted more time, the total
time should not exceed 18 months. Parties can agree upon other time limits,
Article 21:4.
Disputes arising over implementation measures and their compliance with
covered agreements shall be settled by the dispute settlement procedure. The
original panel is to be used whenever possible and a report should be
circulated within ninety days, Article 21:5.131
The DSB is responsible for the surveillance of implementation of adopted
recommendations and rulings. Implementation-compliance will be on the
agenda of a DSB meeting 6 months after establishment of a reasonable time
period, and until the issue is resolved. Ten days before that initial meeting,
the WTO member in question must provide a written status report on
implementation. But any WTO member may raise the issue of
implementation at the DSB meeting after the adoption of the report, Article
21:6. If a recommendation and ruling are not implemented within a
reasonable time, a plaintiff can request negotiations for deciding a mutually
acceptable compensation. Compensation is voluntary but there is an
obligation to negotiate in good faith. If these negotiations do not succeed
within 20 days after the reasonable period of time has ended, a plaintiff may
request authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions or other
obligations under the covered agreement to the WTO member concerned, if
                                                
130 Jackson, p. 168. DSU art. 3.2, 3.7, 7.1, 11, 15.2, 17.13, 21.1, 21.3, 22.1, 22.6, 26.1b.
131 Such disputes have occurred under the WTO. For more information see Reinhardt II. For
the sake of this paper, time did not allow a further investigation of the matter.
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that agreement allows such action. Concessions should first be suspended
within the sector related to the dispute, or if that is not deemed efficient, in
other sectors of the same agreement, or in sectors under other agreements.
The level of suspension should be equivalent to the level of the NIO.
Compensation and suspension of concessions are considered temporary
measures before full implementation can be achieved. Suspension of
concessions will only be applied until the violation of a covered agreement
has ceased or a mutually acceptable solution has been reached, Article 22:1-5,
8. DSB should grant authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations within 30 days of the expiration of the reasonable time unless the
DSB decides by consensus to reject the request, Article 22:6. The defendant
can request that the matter be referred to arbitration if a suspension of a
concession or other obligation does not conform to the procedure in the DSU,
or is higher than the NIO in question. The original panel should, when
possible, carry out the arbitration, otherwise it should be done by an arbitrator
appointed by the Director-General. Arbitration should be completed within
60 days after the expiration of the reasonable time period. Concessions can
not be suspended during arbitration, Article 22:6. The arbitrator has only the
authority to examine whether the level of suspension is equivalent to the level
of NIO, and that it is allowed under the covered agreement. An arbitrator can
also examine claims of procedural breaches. The arbitrator’s decision is final,
Article 22:7.
If a violation of an agreement is found in a non-violation or a situation
dispute, normal disputes settlement rules apply (see also sections 3 and 4.3).
But when the NIO was due to a measure that did not violate an agreement,
special rules apply to the procedure and there is no obligation to withdraw
that measure on behalf of the infringing WTO member. The panel or the AB
will, however, recommend to the WTO member to reach a mutually
satisfactory agreement. Other than that, the biggest difference from the
normal procedure is that decisions lack binding force, Article 26:1-2.
The biggest problem with implementation and enforcement is that the WTO
has no means of forcing WTO members to comply. If a member decides not
to follow a ruling, there is little the WTO can do except for the cancellation
of concessions. Instead, it is in reality up to the “losing” WTO member to
comply out of free will. A possible solution to this problem is to use game
theory and to assume that WTO members indulge in an infinite number of
games with each other in a prefect world.132 If a member cheats, then no one
will want to play a game with him next time. The problem with this theory is
that a very powerful WTO member, maybe a hegemon,133 might be in a
                                                
132 For further reading on the prisoner’s dilemma and game theory, see Gowa,  Joanne.
“Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade”, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994),
pp.11-78.
133 For a discussion of Hegemonic Stability Theory, see  Krasner, Stephen, “State, Power and
the Structure of International Trade”, World Politics, 28(3), 1976, Kindleberger, Charles,
“International Public Goods without International Government”, American Economic
Review, 76(1), 1986:1-13, and Mansfield, Edward, “The Concentration of Capabilities and
International Trade”, International Organization, 46(3), 1992:731-64.
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position to dictate its terms of trade without complying with WTO decision
since WTO member would still want to trade with him due to his powerful
position.
4.9 Arbitration as an Alternative Means of
Settling Disputes
Bilateral arbitration follows procedural rules agreed upon between the parties
and is a rarely used practice within the WTO. Although arbitration is an
autonomous procedure, it is still limited by its integration into the multilateral
WTO dispute settlement system. Arbitration is supposed to be used only
when the issues in a dispute are clearly defined by both parties and there is a
mutual agreement on the procedure to be followed.134 All WTO members
must be notified of an agreement to enter into arbitration in order to give
other members a chance to become parties to the arbitration. Other WTO
members can only be part of arbitration upon agreement with the initiating
parties. The result of an arbitration should be notified to the DSB, and the
Council or Committee of any relevant agreement. Any other WTO member
may raise any point relating to the arbitration award. The reason for this is
that an arbitration award, although binding for the parties, cannot affect rights
and obligations of third members or the power of the DSB to interpret WTO
rules differently. Most of the same rules apply to the implementation of an
arbitration reward as to the implementation of the recommendation and
rulings of a panel, Article 25.135
4.10 WTO Precedent and International Law
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann argues that the adoption of a dispute settlement
report could constitute ”consequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” in
terms of Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
This would mean that such a report had to be taken into account when
interpreting GATT law. But, although GATT dispute settlement practice
often referred to interpretations in previous reports, it also confirmed that
judicial and other dispute settlement decisions do not have legally binding
“precedent effect” for future disputes, in accordance with general
international law. This was further emphasized in the 1996 Appellate Body
Report on Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages.136 The AB stated that panel
reports were an important part of the GATT aquis and that they also created
legal expectations among WTO members. They should therefore be taken
into account when they were relevant to a dispute. But, a panel report was
only binding to the particular dispute it was designed to resolve. Petersmann
                                                
134 This might include cases where the facts are not disputed. An agreement on procedural
rules includes selection of arbitrators.
135 Petersmann II, p.193. Petersmann I, pp.71-72.
136 WT/DS8/AB/R of 4 October 1996.
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continues to indicate that earlier adopted panel reports do not make the
subsequent dispute res judicata.137
According to international public law there is no stare decisis. This is
indicated in statements of scholars such as Petersmann and Wallace,138 and in
Article 59 of the 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice. But at the
same time there are clear indications in both the DSU and the WP that WTO
rules are to be applied uniformly and in accordance with prior interpretations,
Rule 4 WP (see also section 4.7.2). This concept is not unfamiliar and in
reality explains that the WTO panels and the AB can only interpret the WTO
rules, and not make new ones. But, to some extent this is merely an illusion
as in most national court systems. Inevitably, any provision being interpreted
does to some extent move into unknown territory and may thus be compared
to law making. After all, if a provision were totally clear and unambiguous,
there would be no need for interpretation. So, the lack of stare decisis in the
WTO puts the system on basically the same level as most national courts
systems that allow stare decisis and the overruling of it at the same time. This
is, of course, not a bad system since it provides the opportunity to correct
improper judgments or develop rules as time passes.
4.11 Inter-governmentalism, Supranationality,
Transparency and International Law
Inter-governmental organizations are normally created for a number of
reasons.139 By closer cooperation members are supposed to mutually benefit
from the arrangement, whatever field is regulated. In history, the most
frequent inter-governmental arrangements have been related to war and peace
with the notion that peacetime cooperation will create bonds that are not
easily broken in times of war and low-intensity conflict. One of the best
examples of such an organization is, of course, the EU. At the same time as
members enter organizations by their own free will, the organization will in
most cases also impose obligations on them. This obligation may involve
surrendering part of a member’s sovereignty within the regulated field. The
EU is probably the most integrated inter-governmental organization existing
in the world today and its character as inter-governmental or supranational is
debated vividly among scholars today. A very important aspect of this
surrender of sovereignty is the degree of transparency existing within the
system. Transparency is regarded as a safeguard against arbitrary
administrative decisions and a form of checks and balances used to ensure
that decision-making is done in accordance with rules acceptable to a
“democratic” organization and society.
                                                
137 Petersmann I, p.39.
138 Petersmann I, p.39, Wallace, Rebecca M.M., “International Law”, 3rd ed., (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1997), p.25.
139 For the sake of this paper, the WTO is considered to be an inter-governmental
organization.
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One of the most important aspects of being a member of an inter-
governmental organization is to what degree members are bound by decisions
made by the organization. While it ought to be clear that decisions that were
foreseeable for prospective members before ratifying an international
agreement are binding on the members, the problem is instead the further
development of obligations under covered agreements by amendments or
interpretations.140 Realist scholars in international relations have emphasized
the lack of enforcement powers among international organizations claiming
that nation states are the only true actors on the international arena and that
they do only what they please. Others argue that these organizations can raise
the cost of non-compliance by creating a web of bargains that a nation will
put at risk if it acts "opportunistically". This might be a workable alternative
to enforcement.141
The dispute settlement system can be seen as a supranational encroachment
of sovereign matters since the binding nature of the WTO arrangement can
force decisions by organization bodies into domestic politics according to
Sylvia Ostry.142 This might impose new obligations on members. If such a
development is the effect of a ruling or a recommendation of the DSB, there
will be a conflict with the obligations included in Article 3:2 and 3:5 DSU.
These provisions state that a ruling or recommendation of the DSB cannot
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements at the same time as they cannot nullify or impair benefits accruing
to WTO members under these agreements, nor impede the attainment of any
objective of them. Therefore, WTO members should not be bound by this
development. In addition, the WTO Agreement is an inter-governmental
agreement controlled by international public law and should therefore be
governed by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.143 There is
no obligation for countries to ratify the agreement unless they choose to of
their own free will.144 According to Article 40 of the Vienna Convention, an
amendment does not bind a state, which fail to become a party to the
amending agreement, although being a party to the original treaty. Also,
concerning interpretations, the more limited interpretation and the one that
will restrict a state’s sovereignty the least is preferred.145 If new obligations
are unacceptable to a member, they can either choose not to become a part of
that agreement, or withdraw from the WTO in accordance with Article X and
XV of the WTO Agreement. A withdrawal applies both to the WTO
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements. It takes effect six months
                                                
140 Interpretation of any covered multilateral agreement can be adopted by a three-quarters
majority of the WTO members, Article IX WTO Agreement. Amendments can be adopted
through consensus or by a two-thirds majority depending on the issue, Article X WTO
Agreement.
141 Comment by assistant professor Michael Hiscox, Department of Political Science,
University of California, San Diego, US.
142 Ostry, p.21.
143 The treaty was signed May 23, 1969 and entered into force January 1980. It will be
referred to as the Vienna Convention in this paper.
144 At the same time, it is obvious that most countries would consider it impossible to stand
outside the WTO framework without jeopardizing important trade benefits.
145 Wallace, p.235.
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from the date a written notice of withdrawal is received by the Director-
General of the WTO. Withdrawal from a Plurilateral Trade Agreement is
governed by the provisions of that specific agreement. One important thing to
remember, however, is that the “single undertaking approach” of the WTO
Agreement was created as a response to the growing fragmentation of the
GATT system and the so-called “GATT à la carte”.146 This approach is of
course in conflict with the idea to have interpretations and amendments only
binding to WTO members who have accepted them.
How, then will treaties, amendments and interpretations be received in the
WTO member’s domestic arena? The following account will provide some
brief outlines of the treaty-making power of the US and the EU.147
Treaty law in the US are made by the President but can only be ratified after
approval by the Senate.148 Such treaties are the “supreme law of the lands”,149
but this only places them on an equal footing with federal statutes. If a treaty
is in conflict with an already existing statutes, the treaty is treated as lex
posterior150 only if the two “are absolutely incompatible and the Statute
cannot be enforced without antagonizing the treaty”. In case of a conflict with
a subsequent statute, the latter prevails. A treaty is not repealed or modified
by a subsequent statute unless that is the clear expressed intention of
Congress.151 From this, it is evident that an amendment or interpretation
expanding the covered agreements beyond what was originally approved of
may have a serious effect on domestic policy. But, a subsequent statute can
easily repeal this effect.
The EU has exclusive competence to regulate policy pertaining to agriculture,
transport, foreign trade and competition within the union. This internal
competence also covers some areas where the community and member states
have shared competence, inter alia environmental issues. According to the
ERTA-case,152 the Union’s external competence is a mirror image of its
internal competence. Article 300 Amsterdam153 permits the Community to
conclude international agreements (in general) with one or more states or
international organizations. International trade agreements are regulated by
Article 133 Amsterdam and are negotiated by the Commission after
authorization by the Council of the European Union.154 The Council makes a
decision by qualified majority without hearing the European Parliament,
                                                
146 Utrikesdepartementet, p.11.
147 This falls outside the scope of this paper but represents an important issue.
148 Article II (2) of the Constitution of the United States of America.
149 Article IV of the Constitution of the United States of America.
150 The complete maxim lex posterior derogat priori.
151 Wallace pp.49-50 and U.S. Supreme Court cases Johnson v. Browne 205 U.S. 309 at 321
(1907), Edye v. Robertson 112 U.S. 580 at 599 (1884), and Cooke v. The United States 288
U.S. 102 at 119-120 (1933).
152 22/70 Commission v Council (Re European Road Transport Agreement) [1971] ECR 263.
153 This refers to the consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (the Treaty of Rome’s wording after the Treaty of Amsterdam).
154 The scope of Article 133 is wide according to Opinion 1/75 Local Cost Standard [1975]
ECR 2871.
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Article 133.4 and 300.3 Amsterdam. The Council, the Commission or a
member state can submit a proposed agreement to the ECJ for examination
whether it conforms to Community law or not, Article 300.6 Amsterdam.
International agreements concluded according to Article 300 Amsterdam are
binding on the Community and the member states, Article 300.7 Amsterdam.
A concluded agreement can later be tried by the ECJ since it is part of
Community law. The ECJ, however, cannot with binding force determine the
international public law aspects of an international agreement that the
Community or a member state is part of. The agreement’s effect within the
Community, though, falls under general Community law. In the International
Fruit-case155 the ECJ dealt with the effects of GATT 1947. The Court
concluded that the interpretation of GATT 1947 fell under their jurisdiction.
The Community was bound by GATT 1947, but the rules were not clear and
unconditional enough to create direct effect within the Community.
According to Pålsson & Quitzow, an e contrario conclusion would be that
international agreements binding on the Community might in some cases
have priority to secondary Community law.156
A democratic nation surrendering part of its national sovereignty to an
international organization will in return want insurance that this power is
used in accordance with democratic values and principles. Transparency is
today regarded as a pillar of the multilateral trading system requiring
publication of laws and regulations and the mode of administration in
services or investment regimes. Administrative law is procedural rather than
substantive. It establishes norms to control what government bureaucrats do
and how they do it. Article X GATT 1994 establishes rules for publication
and administration of trade regulation with an emphasis on independent
tribunals and judicial review. It is based on US administrative law with
diffusion of power and checks and balances. The trend towards more
openness has been apparent as the world trading system has grown more
judicial over time, limiting the room for administrative discretion. The Tokyo
Round increased transparency when it introduced the “Understanding
regarding notification, consultation, dispute settlement and surveillance”.
Surveillance was also expanded during the Uruguay Round with the creation
of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TRPM). A way of increasing
transparency would be to create a monitoring body or an ombudsman to hear
complaints about abusive use of power or impropriety in dispute settlement
proceedings. This might supplement the use of the DSB, panels and the AB
in these cases. Implementation of transparency requirements can, however, be
difficult for countries with systems different from western countries.157 In the
future, dispute body decisions and the WTO decision-making process may
                                                
155 21, 24/72 International Fruit Co. NV v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR
1219.
156 For more instruction see Pålsson & Quitzow pp. 253-264, Steiner & Woods pp.60-61 and
22/70 ERTA [1971] ECR 263, 8/73 Massey Ferguson [1973] ECR 897, Opinion 1/75 Local
Cost Standard [1975] ECR 1355, Opinion 1/76 Inland Waterway Vessels [1971] ECR 741,
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157 E.g. former Eastern block countries and China.
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increase the demand for more transparency.158 This debate can be compared
to the existing debate over the democratic deficit within the EU.
                                                
158 Ostry, pp.14-17.
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5 The Dispute Settlement
Procedure & Efficiency
5.1 Introduction
A new, improved dispute settlement procedure was one of the major issues
on the agenda for the Uruguay Round. For several countries, inter alia Japan
and the US, it was one of the key issues. After the creation of the WTO and
the new dispute settlement procedure, several observers indicated that US
trade policy would shift to a greater reliance on the new mechanism in trade
negotiations.159 One of the reasons for this was that it would now be easier to
get a dispute settled under the WTO since the possibility of a unilateral veto
had disappeared. Another reason was that the estimated time to settle a
dispute under the DSU (nine to twelve months) was expected to become
shorter than the time required for successful bilateral negotiations.
John Jackson indicated that two to three times the normal amount of cases
were brought under the WTO in its initial years, compared to the later years
of GATT. Developing countries were also said to use it among themselves
which was rare under GATT. This increasing use of the dispute settlement
procedure indicated a greater confidence in the new system due to the greater
predictability and reliability, therefore reducing the risk premium of
international trade. The DSU could work as a fallback to facilitate
negotiations and might be used as a threat.160
While some scholars seem to agree on the fact that the new dispute settlement
procedure facilitates negotiations and that the growing number of cases
brought under it indicates a confidence in the system, Eric Reinhardt takes the
opposite position. In a dissertation presented in 1999, Reinhardt claimed that
the change in the new procedure had little impact on the increasing amount of
cases initiated.161 In support of his findings it is necessary to note that his
dissertation is the first, significant quantitative statistical analysis of dispute
initiation under the WTO.
5.2 Dispute initiation of the US, the EU and
Japan 1948-1999
The purpose of this analysis is to show that the US has made increasing use
of the dispute settlement procedure over time by initiating more disputes. The
analysis will be limited to initiated disputes from 1948 to 1998 and will only
cover disputes initiated by the USA, the EU and Japan. The EU and Japan
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160 Jackson, pp.166, 175.
161 Reinhardt II.
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were added as a comparison since they both represent large trading “nations”
that would be likely to be involved in trade and disputes over trade. The data
examined was collected from three different sources. Eric Reinhardt
compiled a useful database for the GATT period 1948-1993 that was located
on his web-site.162 This was a second-hand source at best. The WTO data was
compiled from a combination of the official web page of the WTO and Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann’s tables over disputes in an analysis over the GATT/WTO
dispute settlement system.163 That data is a combination of first-hand and at
best, second-hand data.
A dispute was considered initiated when a request for consultation was made
or another measure undertaken on behalf of the plaintiff in question. This
means that a few disputes will be represented as initiated by more than one of
the “nations” in question although the dispute may concern the same matter.
For a detailed table of the initiated disputes, see Appendix 5.
It is necessary to note that the US has been a member since 1948, Japan since
1955 and the EU (EEC) since 1958. According to the data collected, no
disputes were initiated during 1994. The reason for this might be the
anticipation of the DSU coming into effect in 1995. Clearly, there has been a
more intense activity on behalf of the US and the EU in later years, with a
peak in 1998. For Japan, however, it is hard to say that there is any real
pattern to follow. Japan has kept a very low profile throughout the existence
of the GATT/WTO. Many of the reasons for this increase in dispute initiation
on behalf of the US have been indicated in previous paragraphs. The popular
explanation is a growing confidence in the new procedure and its ability to
                                                
162 http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~erein/data, accessed 04/15/99.
163 http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletin.htm, accessed 11/16/99. Petersmann II, pp.248-290.
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swiftly settle a dispute quicker and cheaper than traditional trade negotiations.
Under the GATT system, NIOs had to be handled by bilateral trade
negotiations whenever countries estimated it to be quicker than the GATT
dispute settlement procedure. This analysis will now move on to examine
Eric Reinhardt’s contradictory thesis on this subject.
5.3 Alternative Explanations by Eric Reinhardt
In February 1999, Eric Reinhardt presented a statistical analysis of dispute
initiation under GATT/WTO. The paper covered the years 1948-1998 and
quantified a large number of data concerning disputes. His key point was that
disputes represent prima facie conflicts of interest and that they are therefore
not a signal of success, but a potential challenge to the system. He concluded
that the overall probability of initiation had not risen under the WTO. The
growth in the number of disputes initiated was just a function of the rise in
GATT/WTO membership and increasing trade dependence. Democracies
were more likely to initiate disputes and to be targeted as well. In general,
dispute initiation was also more likely in retaliation for a prior dispute,
against a state previously targeted by others, between allies, and, between
recent opponents in militarized disputes.164
He added that just because more cases were filed did not mean that the
system in itself was trusted. This was so because:
• Increasing litigation in civil courts are considered inefficient and costly as
opposed to settling outside of court.
• Most disputes involved a measure in conflict with the GATT 1947 and
thus represented a prima facie conflict of interest where the plaintiff
opposed an outcome preferred by the defendant. Dispute initiation was
therefore an indication of cheating, and not of cooperation.
• The majority of rulings end with no or only partial concessions even after
rulings against the defendant since the WTO lacks enforcement powers.
• Filing of a dispute has inherent costs such as negative trade effect and
transaction costs in litigation.165
• Finally, he stated that the assumption that WTO lowers transaction costs
was problematic because although the veto in the General Council/DSB
had been abolished, new barriers had been erected. These new barriers
included third party addition and negotiations if defendant refused to
comply, which could add up to 29 months before retaliation for non-
compliance was possible.166
                                                
164 Reinhardt II, pp.1-3.
165 Reinhardt II, pp.5-6.
166 Reinhardt II, pp.13-15.
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5.4 Analysis of Reinhardt's arguments
The discussion of Reinhardt’s conclusions will start out with findings I agree
with, moving along to conclusions I do not agree with. In both cases, I will
provide possible alternative reasons for his results. It was not possible to
check Reinhardt’s data for disputes initiated after 1993 since he still has not
released it.167 Due to time constraints, the analysis below cannot offer any
statistical evidence for its standpoints and should therefore only be used as a
source of inspiration for further work in this area.
5.4.1 Democracies are More Likely to Initiate Disputes and to
be Targeted
Eric Reinhardt argued that democracies were more likely to initiate disputes
because they were more responsive to domestic pressure from producers.
Democracies were also more often targeted since they were more likely to
maintain objectionable trade policy due to their disproportionate
representation of producers over consumers.168
It is easy to agree with the notion that democracies would initiate more
disputes and also be targeted more often. But although Reinhardt’s
explanation for this seems very reasonable there might be other additional
reasons for this. First, per definition a democracy is supposed to follow rules
and regulations in general. So, whenever in conflict, a democracy would use
the system at hand. Reinhardt refuted this argument by stating that
democracies were not at all more willing to follow multilateral rules than
non-democracies since they in a larger extent refused to abide to the outcome
of the dispute.169 But although Reinhardt’s findings regarding the outcomes
might be true, it still does not refute the idea that democracies ”believe” in
use of the system. Just because democracies refuse to follow negative
outcomes, does not mean that they do not believe in the judicial system.
Second, depending on the definition of a democracy, it seems fairly clear that
a larger percentage of the WTO’s 135 members should be democracies as
opposed to non-democracies. Out of every initiated dispute, there would thus
be a larger possibility that a democracy either initiated it, or was targeted by
it. Reinhardt did not explain how he determined the democracy index and
there is no way of finding out how many of the WTO disputes were initiated
by democracies in his paper since he has not released the data. Third, the
largest trading “nations” of the world are democracies. They are therefore
more likely to both initiate and be targeted since they maintain more trade
relations than smaller WTO members. The US and the EU, for example, have
been responsible for a large share of all disputes under the GATT/WTO.
                                                
167 Professor Reinhardt said, via email, that the data would be released after a presentation of
some related work of his.
168 Reinhardt II, pp. 3, 10, 11.
169 Reinhardt II, pp. 29.
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5.4.2 Dispute Initiation as Retaliation
The use of dispute initiation in retaliation for prior disputes is a concept
easily understood. It is also a practice widely used in civil proceedings. There
might be several reasons for this strategy. When a plaintiff initiates a dispute,
the defendant may file a counter suit, e.g. in order to reach a better position
for negotiation. Another reason might be that disputes might arise in a
circular fashion: a violating measure inflicted on a WTO member might cause
that member to impose a violating measure of his own on the member
responsible for the first violation.
5.4.3 Dispute Initiation against States Previously Targeted by
Others
Reinhardt stated that an initiated dispute encouraged initiation of more related
disputes out of fear of trade diversion.170 Excluded WTO members would
fear to be left out of a more favorable agreement reached between the original
parties to the dispute.171
This is also a reasonable conclusion. First, it is possible that when there is
one violation, there might often be more. Second, as Reinhardt stated, when a
member brings a successful dispute, other members might be more likely to
also initiate a dispute against the losing WTO member in hope of also
winning some benefit for themselves. Third, when a member loses a dispute
and has to abandon a measure it feels brings them some benefit, the same
member might be likely to try to impose another barrier in the same or
another sector in order to still reach the benefit it had from the first measure,
thus keeping the sum of gains and losses at zero. These benefits could be
anything from tariff income, political support form protectionist forces or
maybe even credibility on the world political field.
5.4.4 Allies, Opponents and Large Trading Nations
Reinhardt concluded that allies were more likely to be involved in a dispute.
One of the reasons for this was that allies tended to trade more with each
other. He did not present any other reasons for the result.172 Opponents in
militarized conflict were also more likely to get into a dispute for obvious
reasons. Reinhardt did not elaborate that finding either. When it came to large
nations, Reinhardt could not find any connection between relative size of
WTO members and probability to initiate disputes. To examine this issue, he
used a variable for GDP ratio for the parties to the disputes. The result could
be explained by an inherent contradiction regarding the strategic behavior of
larger and smaller WTO members. On the one hand, large members may be
                                                
170 For a discussion of trade creation and trade diversion, see Krugman & Obstfeldt, pp.242-
245.
171 Reinhardt II, p.17.
172 Reinhardt II, p.20.
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more desirable targets from the standpoint of market opportunities. But, on
the other hand, large members are less likely to concede, at least to a smaller
member. Another size issue was that members running global trade surpluses
were more likely to be targeted. These members were also more likely to
initiate disputes which does not mix well with the common view that trade
deficits increase political pressure for fair trade.173
All of these findings are easy to agree with. Allies would seem more likely to
succeed in bilateral negotiations. Why then would they instead use the dispute
settlement procedure? It is first necessary to understand the definition used to
determine who is considered an ally to whom. Reinhardt seemed to use a
loose definition examining if the parties to a dispute were at all involved in
some sort of cooperation or alliance (either they were, or they were not).
Since that data could not be examined, this analysis will have to use a
common sense type of definition thinking about blocks like the EU, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). If that definition is true, a likely explanation might be
that allies believe that it is cheaper to settle a dispute within the framework of
the WTO than in bilateral negotiation. If in turn that is true, it would be an
evidence for the thesis of this analysis; that increasing number of dispute
initiation is due to a confidence in the system. But, there are of course
alternative explanations. Since a large number of all WTO members are allied
with other members, it is highly likely that allies will end up in a dispute.
Earlier in this analysis it was shown that a large number of disputes were
started by large trading “nations” like the US and the EU. These “nations”
have several allies. Although Reinhardt could not find any connection
between GDP ratios and probability of disputes, he reported an interesting
finding about trade surpluses. A member running a global trade surplus
should be expected to be targeted more, just as Reinhardt concluded. One
reason for this is that other members might try to open up the home market of
such a member. But why then, would they also initiate more disputes? Well,
as was discussed previously, a targeted member is likely to initiate a counter
suit. Furthermore, big members running trade surpluses would be more likely
to be involved in a large amount of trade and thus be exposed to conflict
situations. This would make them likely to use the strategy of targeting
previously targeted members. Finally, if a member running a trade surplus is
targeted by other members to open up his home market, he might be subject
to aggressive unilateralism,174 as in the case of the US and e.g. Japan.175
Perhaps a more true measurement of a WTO member’s size in trade is the
amount of trade it is in fact involved in. A large GDP does not necessarily
mean that a country is a large trading nation (in theory). Therefore, a more
useful piece of statistics would be some sort of comparison between imports,
exports and GDP. Reinhardt does control for trade levels for part of his
                                                
173 Reinhardt II, pp. 21, 27.
174 For a discussion on  aggressive unilateralism, see Bayard, Thomas & Elliot, Kimberley
Ann, “Reciprocity and Retaliation in US Trade Policy”, (Washington DC.: Institute for
International Economics, 1994), pp. 9-22, 51-97.
175 Bayard & Elliot, p.19.
54
statistics, but how he does that, and the exact statistics used, are not available
for this analysis.
5.4.5 Increasing Amount of Cases as a Sign of Confidence in
the System
Reinhardt argued that just because more cases are filed with the WTO does
not mean that the members have confidence in the system. This is the most
controversial of Reinhardt’s findings.
His first argument that increasing litigation in civil courts is considered
inefficient and costly as opposed to settling outside of court is both correct
and erroneous. The statement in itself is of course correct but dispute
initiation can also be considered efficient since it promotes settlement out of
court. Only a small fraction of all civil law suits and disputes initiated under
the WTO ever go to “court”. The use of dispute initiation as a threat in order
to reach a mutually acceptable solution must be efficient. This conclusion
also strengthens the case for my analysis, while weakening Reinhardt’s
conclusion that the WTO has not had any significant impact on dispute
initiation and the members’ confidence in the system.
Reinhardt’s second argument concerned disputes as prima facie conflicts of
interest. This is an argument that seems hard to understand. The dispute
settlement system was constructed in order to deal with disputes. And a
dispute is per definition a conflict of interest. Why then would this indicate a
lack of confidence in the system? Why would dispute initiation be a
challenge of the dispute settlement system? This analysis can provide no
explanation for Reinhardt’s position, and can offer no contradictory
explanation.
One of Reinhardt’s more valid argument is the fact that the WTO lacks
enforcement power and therefore does not promote confidence in the system.
Evidence for this was that the majority of rulings end with no or only partial
concessions even after rulings against the defendant. This is an argument that
on the surface seems hard to refute. The only possible way to contradict
Reinhardt’s conclusion is to introduce game theory and an infinite amount of
games. A WTO member who does not follow rulings and recommendations
would thus find it more costly to play new games in the future. A reputation
of non-compliance would not only make future games more costly, but would
also make it harder for that same member to force compliance in cases
initiated by itself.176 But a logical counter argument to this would be the fact
that with greater trade dependency, most nations would still be forced to play
with their important trade partners even though they suspect defection.
Reinhardt last argument was that although the new dispute settlement
procedure lowered several barriers and therefore decreased transaction costs,
several new barriers had been erected creating new transaction costs. In order
                                                
176 This angle was suggested by Michael Hiscox.
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to use this argument in support of his conclusion it is necessary to find that
the net effect is at least zero but maybe even positive. But the weight of this
particular argument depends on how the value of the transaction costs is
measured. A true value for this is, of course, impossible to find and an
analysis must instead look at Reinhardt’s argument that WTO members now
face longer time limits before retaliation can be used. Even if this in fact
might be true, it is also worth thinking about the fact that the purpose of the
dispute settlement procedure is not retaliation, but conformity with the aims
and goals of the WTO. This might lead some to conclude that there is a
higher transaction cost de facto, but maybe not de jure. Since this analysis
mainly is dealing with the judicial system, an examination of eventual
transaction costs is outside the scope.
Finally, another important point in support of the thesis of this analysis is the
fact that the new WTO system as a whole presents a more stringent and more
foreseeable set of rules in general. This should mean that there would be
fewer disputes under the WTO than before since members now more easily
can determine whether or not a measure is in conflict with a covered
agreement at the same time as it would be easier to determine success or
failure in the case of a initiated dispute.177 But instead we have seen an
increasing amount of disputes. Why is this? Normally, an increasing amount
of information should make strategic decisions about costs and benefits more
accurate. This would lead to the conclusion that members consider the costs
of disputes less than the costs of bilateral trade negotiations, therefore making
it a rational choice to initiate a dispute.
                                                
177 This idea was also suggested by Michael Hiscox. Keep in mind that interpretation of
covered agreements may not necessarily have become more foreseeable than before just
because the dispute settlement procedure has.
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6 Conclusion
The future development of the WTO rests on the will of its members to
continue cooperating and believing that the benefits will be larger than the
costs. But, with increasing trade dependence, new actors on the international
trade policy scene will also influence the direction the WTO takes. Today,
trade policy is influenced not only by governments, but also by multinational
corporations and international non-governmental organizations. Another
factor is the existence, or non-existence, of an economic and political
hegemon within the global trade regime.178
On the political side of WTO’s future there are several potential problem
areas.
• Some scholars believe there is an external threat against the WTO
involving, inter alia, regional trade blocks and the power struggle
between the US and the EU.179 Regional trade agreements are allowed
under Article XXIV GATT 1994 but are in fact in conflict with the non-
discrimination principle of Articles I and III GATT 1994.
• With the creation of the Ministerial Conference, representatives from the
members’ governments got a permanent voice in the highest decision-
making body of the WTO. This was a necessary improvement of the
GATT system because it acknowledged the importance of global trade in
domestic politics. The problem with these representatives is that they are
dependent on domestic political support and thus subject to the influence
of voters and lobbying.
• Inter-governmental organizations normally involve some supranational
elements. At this point in time, the most natural ways of developing the
WTO would necessarily include loss of sovereignty on behalf of the
WTO members. This development would need to be approved in
domestic fora and thus be subject to scrutiny by the citizens of the WTO
members. The image of the WTO in the public eyes must therefore be
positive.
• With the loss of sovereignty transparency becomes vital. The TPRM has
helped in this area encouraging members to follow WTO rules and to
fulfill their commitments under the covered agreements. A further way of
increasing transparency would be to create a monitoring body or an
ombudsman to hear complaints about abusive use of power or
impropriety in dispute settlement proceedings. This might supplement the
use of the DSB, panels and the AB in these cases, especially since these
proceedings to a large extent are confidential and thus do not promote
transparency.
                                                
178 For a discussion on Hegemonic Stability Theory, see  Krasner, Stephen, “State, Power and
the Structure of International Trade”, World Politics, 28(3), 1976; Kindleberger, Charles,
“International Public Goods without International Government”, American Economic
Review, 76(1), 1986:1-13; and Mansfield, Edward, “The Concentration of Capabilities and
International Trade”, International Organization, 46(3), 1992:731-64.
179 Sjöstedt II, pp.31-32.
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• The “one single undertaking” approach in Article XVI (5) WTO
Agreement is threatened by, inter alia, disagreement over how to deal
with new areas of trade. This threat is very clear in the conflict between
developing and developed countries regarding linking, e.g., labor
standards and environmental issues with trade. If an agreement cannot be
reached, there is a risk of creating a multi-tier “WTO à la carte” where the
continued liberalization of global trade would be hampered.
The WTO dispute settlement system also includes several problem areas.
• The possibility to initiate non-violation and situation complaints under
Article XXIII:I GATT 1994 is in conflict with Article 3:2 DSU. But,
rulings and recommendations based on these types of complaints are not
binding. Therefore, a conflict arising under these circumstances is in fact
a signal to the WTO as an organization to execute its legislative rather
than its judiciary power. Only by altering, or amending, existing
agreements can measures leading to non-violation or situation complaints
be prevented from occurring, or at least be justiciable.
• The ad hoc character of panels is a major weakness that may promote
distrust in the system. A more permanent system would increase the
experience of panelists and may also make it possible to remand appealed
disputes from the AB.
• The AB’s lack of remand power curtails an appellant’s right to a panel
proceeding by functioning, in essence, as a court of first instance.
• The total confidentiality surrounding the proceedings involving possible
violation of the RC does not promote confidence in the dispute settlement
system. Only by assuring the total impartiality of individuals serving in
adjudicating positions can the integrity of the system be guaranteed. It
would instead be better to have some public control of such matters.
• The references to notions of fairness in some dispute settlement
provisions may be in conflict with Articles 3:2 and 3:5 DSU. This
includes non-violation and situation complaints in Article XXIII:1 GATT
1994, and Rule 16(1-2) WP.
• It is necessary to give the WTO the possibility to enforce dispute
settlement rulings. This could mean a surrender of sovereignty on behalf
of the WTO members and may therefore be practically impossible.
• In accordance with public international law, there is no stare decisis in the
WTO. But this is merely an “illusion” as in domestic court systems that
allow stare decisis and the overruling of it at the same time. There is also
indications of a desire to create WTO precedent in Rule 4 WP. It is
possible, however, that as the legal framework of the WTO grows more
and more judicial the character may change as the judicial system of the
EEC/EU did.
• Interpretations of covered agreements by, inter alia, dispute settlement
bodies may seem to impose new obligations on the WTO members. But
they are only bound by the concessions already made during their
membership negotiations. Future development in multilateral trade
negotiations or dispute settlement rulings cannot impose new obligations
on existing members according to Articles 3:2 and 3:5 DSU.
58
The increasing amount of initiated disputes under the WTO has been seen as
a sign of greater confidence in the new system. Eric Reinhardt has presented
an impressive quantified analysis of dispute initiation under both the GATT
and the WTO reaching the opposite conclusion. It is easy to agree with many
of his conclusions although this analysis has suggested that there might be
alternative explanations for some of his findings. But when it comes to
Reinhardt’s main point about increasing number of disputes initiated
representing a challenge to the system, I am compelled to disagree. My
analysis has presented reasons for why the growing number of disputes
initiated is a sign of confidence in the system. Some of the ideas presented by
both Reinhardt and myself depend upon accurate definitions and statistics
that in some cases cannot be assessed, e.g. transaction costs. It is therefore,
quite possible that there is too little statistical information about dispute
initiation under the WTO to make any clear statements of the development or
the future confidence in the system.
Finally, it is necessary to remember that the WTO is a membership
organization and therefore somewhat at the mercy of its members. The
individual WTO members are in turn subject to the democratic pressure from
voters. In order to continue the liberalization of global trade it is therefore
important to have the support of voters all over the world. The 3rd Ministerial
Conference in Seattle, US, was supposed to be the launchpad for a new
multilateral negotiation round starting sometime in the new millenium. At the
site of the conference, demonstrators gathered to protest against, inter alia,
the WTO’s undemocratic structure and its alleged role in hampering the
economic progress of developing countries. The extensive protests may to
some extent have damaged the WTO meeting in Seattle, but the more serious
damage was done to the image of the WTO in the eyes of the average citizen
associating the organization with teargas, riot-police and arrests as opposed to
liberalized trade and economic development.
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Appendix 1
Structure of the WTO.
Dispute
Settlement Body
Appellate
Body
Dispute
Settlement
Panels
Secretariat
Ministerial
Conference
General Council Trade Policy
Review Body
Council for
Trade in
Services
Council for
Trade in
Goods
Council for
Trade-Related
Aspects of
Intellectual
Property Rights
Four Committees:
1. Trade & Development
2. Trade & Environment
3. Balance-of-Payment
Restricitions
4. Budget, Finance &
Administration
Five Sub-groups:
1. Working Party on
Professional Services
2. Committee on Trade in
Financial Services
3. Negotiation Group on
Maritime Transport Services
4. Negotiation Group on
Movement of Natural Persons
5. Negotiation Group on Basic
Telecommunications
Twelve Committees:
1. Market Access
2. Agriculture
3. Sanitary & Phytosanitary Measures
4. Trade-Related Investment Measures
5. Rules of Origin
6. Subsidies & Countervailing Measures
7. Customs Valuation
8. Technical Barriers to Trade
9. Anti-Dumping Practices
10. Import Licensing
11. Safeguards
12. Textiles Monitoring Body
Four Plurilateral Agreements:
1. Committee on Trade in Civil
Aircraft
2. Committee on Government
Procurement
3. International Dairy Council
4. International Meat Council
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Appendix 2
Overview of the WTO dispute settlement procedure.180
                                                
180 http://www.wto.org/wto/about/dispute2.htm accessed 04/15/99.
61
Appendix 3
Appendix 1 to DSU
Agreements covered by the Understanding
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
Agreement)
(B) Multilateral Trade Agreements
Annex 1A:Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods (GATT 1994)
Annex 1B:General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
Annex 1C:Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs)
Annex 2:Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU)
(C) Plurilateral Trade Agreements
Annex 4:Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft
Agreement on Government Procurement
International Dairy Agreement
International Bovine Meat Agreement
The applicability of the DSU to the Plurilateral Trade Agreements shall be
subject to the adoption of a decision by the parties to each agreement setting
out the terms for the application of the DSU to the individual agreement,
including any special or additional rules or procedures for inclusion in
Appendix 2, as notified to the DSB.
Appendix 2 to DSU
Special or additional rules and procedures contained in the covered agreements
Agreement Rules and Procedures
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 11.2
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 2.14, 2.21, 4.4, 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 8.1
through 8.12
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 14.2 through 14.4, Annex 2
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 17.4 through 17.7
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994 19.3 through 19.5,
Annex II.2(f), 3, 9, 21
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 4.2 through 4.12, 6.6, 7.2
through 7.10, 8.5,  footnote 35, 24.4, 27.7, Annex V
General Agreement on Trade in Services XXII:3, XXIII:3
Annex on Financial Services 4
Annex on Air Transport Services 4
Decision on Certain Dispute Settlement Procedures for the GATS 1 through 5
The list of rules and procedures in this Appendix includes provisions where only a
part of the provision may be relevant in this context. Any special or additional rules
or procedures in the plurilateral trade agreements as determined by the competent
bodies of each agreement and as notified to the DSB.
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Appendix 4
Timetables for consultation and appellate review. Timetable for panel
proceedings is in Appendix 2.
Table 3. Time-table for consultation from Day 0
Request for consultation 0
Defendant’s reply 0-10
Defendant enter into consultation 0-30
Earliest possible time to request
formation of a panel if defendant does
not enter into consultation
31
Result has to be achieved within 0-60
Request panel 61
Table 4. Timetable for appellate review from Day 0
Notice of Appeal 0
Appellant’s submission 0-10
Multiple appellant’s submission 0-15
Response to multiple appellant’s
submissions
0-25
Appellee’s submission 0-25
Third participants submissions 0-25
Oral hearing 30
Circulation of appellate report 30-60, but no longer than 90
DSB meeting for adoption +30 days = 60-120
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Appendix 5
Table of cases initiated by the EU, Japan and the US 1948 to 1998.
Year EU Japan USA Year EU Japan USA
1948 0 0 1 1980 0 0 2
1949 0 0 1 1981 1 0 2
1950 0 0 1 1982 1 1 8
1951 0 0 1 1983 5 0 2
1952 0 0 2 1984 5 0 1
1954 0 0 3 1985 0 0 2
1955 0 0 1 1986 6 0 3
1956 0 0 2 1987 3 1 6
1962 0 0 3 1988 2 1 8
1963 1 0 0 1989 2 0 6
1969 0 0 1 1990 0 0 2
1970 0 0 2 1991 2 1 3
1972 0 0 3 1992 3 0 0
1973 1 0 3 1993 1 1 0
1975 0 0 1 1995 2 1 2
1976 1 0 2 1996 8 2 14
1977 0 1 1 1997 14 1 14
1978 1 0 1 1998 17 1 6
1979 0 0 2
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